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Introduction
In this work, we aim at investigating recent trends and developments in the British
labour market. This dissertation is composed of three research papers that present
and discuss different aspects of labour market inequalities in the United King-
dom. The first and the second chapters are solo papers, while the third one is
co-authored with Prof. Paul Gregg and Prof. Paul Clarke.
In the first chapter, we analyze recent changes in the labour market structure
at the occupational level in Britain. Using data from the UK Skills Surveys be-
tween 1997 and 2006, we present evidence of job polarisation, that is a shift from
a monotonic to a U-shaped relationship between growth in employment share and
occupation’s percentile in the wage distribution. The economic literature high-
lights the role of technological change as the driving force behind these changes.
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) (hereafter ALM) provided the so called “routin-
isation” hypothesis, showing that technological progress can lead to a reduction
of routine tasks - easily replicated by machines - which are usually performed by
middle-skilled workers. On the contrary, non-manual non-routine tasks carried out
mainly within high-paying occupations, are productive complements to technol-
ogy. Finally, despite manual non-routine tasks that comprise many of the unskilled
low-paid jobs are not directly influenced by technological progress, its impact in
other parts of the economy is likely to lead to a rise in employment in these kind of
works because of shift of employment from technologically progressive industries
(e.g. manufacturing) to non-progressive industries (e.g. services). In this chapter
we analyze in detail the task content of the occupations which display the most
significant employment changes between 1997 and 2006 in light of ALM (2003)
“routinisation hypothesis”. We show that changes in employment shares are nega-
tively related to the initial level of routine intensity. Unlike previous studies using
xi
the same data, we explore the impact of computerisation on routine task inputs
excluding low-paying occupations that are not supposed to be directly affected
by technological change. We show that our routine measure, which is negatively
related to computerisation, is likely to capture both the manual and the cogni-
tive routine dimension. Finally, by using retrospective questions on past jobs, we
provide evidence of occupational mobility of middle-paid workers, showing that
they did not predominantly reallocate their labour supply to low-paying occupa-
tions. Our interpretation is that explanations of the significant job expansion at
the lower tail of the distribution entirely based on the displacement of national
middle-skilled workers are not fully satisfactory. The role of increasing immigration
inflows of low-skilled workers should also be taken into account.
The second chapter investigates recent changes in the occupational distribution
of immigrants in the United Kingdom and it deals with the effects of immigration
on local labour markets. From the mid-1990s, there was an increasing tendency
for immigrants to be present at the lower end of the occupational classification
(particularly in operatives, service and sale workers and elementary occupations)
and not only in very high-skilled jobs. One major concern for immigrant-receiving
countries are of course the effects that foreign-born supply has on local labour
market. Previous literature considers traditional labour market outcomes such as
wages, employment, unemployment and participation rate. Here we adopt a differ-
ent perspective introduced by Peri and Sparber (2009) who investigate the effect
of immigration on the task specialisation of natives. This paper aims at evaluating
whether natives, who are assumed to have a comparative advantage relative to im-
migrants in communication as opposed to manual tasks, are induced to specialise
in communication-intensive jobs in response to immigration inflows. We focus on
the bottom end of the occupational distribution by looking at the impact of less-
skilled foreign-born on similarly educated native workers. Our main data source
is the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the years 1997-2006 and we derive our
task intensity measures at the occupational level from an additional source, the UK
Skills Surveys. In this paper not only do we contribute to the literature on migra-
tion in the United Kingdom by applying a novel task-based approach, but we also
make a methodological progress with respect to previous studies on immigration
and task-specialisation in European countries by measuring the task content of
occupations from national survey data, instead of relying on US sources (O*Net).
Our main empirical findings show that in the UK natives respond to increasing
immigration by shifting their task supply and providing more communication rela-
tive to manual tasks. By instrumenting the share of foreign-born workers, we show
that the positive effect on the relative task supply is plausibly causal.
Finally, the third chapter considers an additional source of inequality in the
labour market due to earnings disparities between men and women within house-
holds. Over the last 40 years or so the labour market has seen a gender revolution in
labour market participation and wages. The traditional male breadwinner model,
with the male earning in the labour market and women engaged in child bearing
and home production, steadily declined. In this paper we explore the implications
of these huge changes for the evolution of the spousal wage gap, alternatively called
spousal pay gap or gender pay gap within couples, and its relationship with the
overall pay gap, changes in labour force participation and the level of assortative
mating between partners. Gender wage differentials have been extensively studied
by labour economists and the literature is very broad and well-established. Yet,
empirical research has traditionally focused on overall differences between men’s
and women’s wages and there are few studies on earning disparities within cou-
ples. The specific interest on spousal wage gap can show how the shift towards
greater gender equality plays out within families. But also because of the potential
to change investment decisions within couples and by employers which affect in
the long-run future earnings growth and labour market outcomes and for future
economic modeling of gender wage differentials based on the household. The pa-
per starts with a statistical model which shows how the probability of a positive
spousal wage gap (male wage greater than partners) depends on the average gen-
der wage gap, the variance of the male and female wage distributions and on the
level of sorting or assortative mating, based on wages, there is among couples. The
model shows how men can still earn more than their partners even with a low
overall pay gap when assortative mating is high or the variance in earnings is low.
We show how the model fits the data well and use it to explore what lies behind
the observed decline in men earning more than their partners in terms of hourly
wages. Among dual earner couples 79% of men earn more than their partners in
1991 and this falls to just above 72% by 2008. This is being driven by falls in the
within couple gender pay gap from nearly 45% to 32% over the period. We then
turn to changing participation patterns of men and women and how this affects
our story. We employ the estimation method developed by Wooldridge (1995) to
correct for sample selection in panel data models where we can observe wages in
other periods for individuals. We show that women who are excluded from labour
market participation are increasingly those with the lowest potential wage.
Chapter 1
Job Polarisation in Britain from a
Task-Based Perspective. Evidence
from the UK Skills Surveys
1.1 Introduction
From the 1990s onwards, radical changes in the employment structure at the oc-
cupational level occurred in several industrialised countries, notably the United
States and the United Kingdom. Together with the employment growth in high-
paying managerial and professional occupations and the fall in the share of middle-
income jobs, low-paying service occupations started to grow. These changes led to
a shift from a monotonic to a U-shaped relationship between growth in employ-
ment share and occupation’s percentile in the wage distribution. This phenomenon
has been defined as “job polarisation”.
The economic literature highlights the role of demand shocks - particularly
the technology-based ones - as the driving force behind these changes. Autor,
Levy and Murnane (2003) (hereafter ALM) explain job polarisation in light of the
impact of technological change on the categories of workplace tasks. Substitution or
complementarity opportunities between computer use and the activities performed
by workers led to a polarised labour market. Middle-income workers performing
routine activities, replaced by machines, were induced to reallocate their labour
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supply in non-routine intense occupations and to perform tasks with a higher
marginal productivity.
We contribute to the literature on employment polarisation in the United King-
dom at the occupational level using data from the UK Skills Surveys, which allow
a detailed analysis of activities performed in British workplaces and the use of
computers. Differently from Goos and Manning (2003 and 2007), we do not rely
on task measures for the United States1 to quantify the task intensities associated
to each occupation. No assumption on the same task composition of occupations
and the same impact of technology in the two countries is therefore needed.
We first provide preliminary evidence of job polarisation in our sample, con-
firming that between 1997 and 2006 employment shares increased at the two ex-
tremes of the occupation wage distribution, while they decreased in the middle.
There is no evidence instead that wages followed the same pattern. We classify oc-
cupations in manual/non-manual and routine/non-routine according to the ALM
theoretical framework. We analyze in detail the task content of those occupations
which display the most significant employment changes during the period under
consideration.
Next, we explore the relationship between computer use and routine task in-
puts, which we define on the basis of the frequency of repetitive activities that
workers are asked to perform on the job. Unlike previous studies using the same
data at the occupational level (e.g. Green, 2009 and 2012)2, we exclude from the
analysis low-paying occupations that are not supposed to be directly affected by
technological change and for which there are no clear predictions from a theoretical
standpoint. We deem that this exclusion is also appropriate in light of the findings
on the routine dimension in these occupations, which could be a source of bias.
The negative impact of computerisation that we find is therefore clearly associated
with routine middling-paying jobs.
Claiming that the a priori identification of routine tasks is problematic, Green
1The US Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and the subsequent
online database Occupational Information Network (O*NET) are used to impute to workers the
task measures associated with their occupations. ALM provide details on how the DOT/O*NET
task measures are constructed.
2 Lindley (2012) explores the gender dimension of technological change but at the industry
level and not considering the routineness of tasks.
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(2012) considers as such only repetitive manual activities. We show that our repet-
itive task index is equally correlated both with the O*Net manual and cognitive
routine measures, once low-paying occupations are excluded. Although we cannot
disentangle the negative effect of computerisation on routine tasks into a cognitive
and a manual component (typical of clerical and production work, respectively),
we deem that both aspects are embedded in our index.
Finally, we exploit retrospective questions on past jobs, relating the phenomenon
of employment polarisation to the displacement of middle-paid workers. We find
evidence of an increasing tendency over time of middle-paid workers to change
occupation. The fact that these workers did not predominantly shift towards low-
paying occupations is consistent with the argument that also low-skilled immi-
grants played a major role in the expansion of low-paid jobs.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature.
In Section 3 we describe the data used. Section 4 provides preliminary evidence on
labour market polarisation. Section 5 examines the association between employ-
ment changes and the task content of occupations. Section 6 focuses on the impact
of computer adoption on routine tasks, considering only high and middling-paying
occupations for which there are clear predictions of substitution or complementar-
ity effects. Section 7 analyses the occupational mobility of middle-paid workers.
Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review on Job Polarisation
Evidence of employment polarisation, that is a relative employment increase of
low and high-paid (skilled)3 jobs with respect to the middle-paid (skilled) ones,
have been found for the United States (Wright and Dwyer, 2003; Autor and Dorn,
2009; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011), the United Kingdom (Goos and Manning, 2003
and 2007), Germany (Spitz-Oener, 2006; Dustmann et al. 2009; Kampelmann and
Rycx, 2011) and Japan (Ikenaga and Kambayashi, 2010). With regards to Europe,
3The term skilled is here used as a synonym for educated. Formal education is a traditional skill
measure widely used in the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) literature. Being education
positively related to wages at the occupational level, we consider high, middle and low-skilled
workers to be on average also high, middle and low-paid.
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results are more mixed. Goos et al. (2010) conclude that on average the employ-
ment structure in Western European countries has been polarising between 1993
and 2006. Conversely, Ferna´ndez-Mac´ıas (2012) and Nellas and Olivieri (2012),
show very heterogenous results among European countries and do not provide
evidence of a pervasive polarisation4.
Whereas in the United States there was a clear correspondence between em-
ployment (quantity) and wage (price) movements, the polarisation of wages does
not seem to be common to other countries. Dustmann et al. (2009) show that
Germany and the United States experienced similar changes at the top of the
wage distribution from the 1980s and 1990s, but the pattern of lower-tail move-
ments was distinct. Similarly, Antonczyk et al. (2010) find little evidence of wage
polarisation in Germany. Concerning more specifically the United Kingdom, the
well-documented increase in overall wage inequality since the early 1980s (e.g.
Machin, 1996 and 2008) began to slow in the mid-1990s. Trends in inequality then
split into two, with the ratio of middle to bottom earnings flattening out and the
ratio of top to middle continuing to grow (Stewart, 2012). However, there is no
evidence that low wages grew faster than the middle ones leading to a polarised
trend (Holmes and Mayhew, 2010)5. More generally, Massari et al. (2013) conclude
that there are no wage polarisation trends in Europe, neither at the industry nor
at the individual level.
The positive and monotonic relationship between wage and employment growth
characterising the 1980s is well explained by the skill-biased technological change
(SBTC) hypothesis6 (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Berman
4 It should be noted, however, that the methodology used in these analyses is not exactly the
same. Differently from Goos et al. (2010), Nellas and Olivieri (2012) rank occupations according
to the average educational attainments and not the average wage. Ferna´ndez-Mac´ıas (2012)
classify occupations in three equally-sized groups in terms of employment shares instead of using
the uneven grouping followed by Goos et al. (2010).
5Oesch and Rodr´ıguez Mene´s (2011) provide evidence of a positive correlation coefficient
between changes in wages and employment across quintiles in Britain from 1993 to 2008. However,
the authors claim that their findings should be treated with caution given that the analysis is
not based on high quality data for wages (ie. the Labour Force Survey).
6Other explanations are considered, but the technology-based one is the most prominent.
Several studies focus on the role of expanding international trade and offshoring, which involves
the relocation to lower wage countries of only certain parts of the production process and therefore
specific occupations (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005, Blinder, 2007; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg,
2008; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Other studies investigate the role of labour market institutions,
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et al., 1998; Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). The SBTC hypothesis relates the job
expansion at the top quintiles of the wage distribution and the increase in college
wage to technological progress favoring high-skilled workers at the expense of the
others. However, it is not able to explain an increase of employment shares in low-
skilled jobs and it therefore does not provide a wholly satisfactory framework for
interpreting recent key trends in labour markets7.
In light of the above remarks, a more nuanced and refined version of SBTC was
put forward to explain the phenomenon of job polarisation, focusing on the impact
of computerisation on the different categories of workplace tasks. ALM provided
the so called “routinisation” hypothesis which is consistent with a “task-biased”
version of technological change. In the ALM model, technological progress takes
the form of an exogenous drop in the price of computers which leads to a reduction
of both non-manual and manual routine tasks.
Non-manual routine tasks are characteristic of clerical and administrative oc-
cupations while manual routine tasks are typical of production and operative oc-
cupations. Given a strong substitution with technology, these tasks can be easily
replicated by machines and automated. On the contrary, non-manual non-routine
tasks carried out mainly within managerial, professional and creative occupations
and usually performed by high-skilled workers, are productive complements to
computers. Finally, concerning manual non-routine tasks, the ALM framework
does not explicitly predict neither strong substitution nor strong complementarity
with computers because this category is not supposed to be directly affected by
technological change. Indeed, manual non-routine tasks which are typical of ser-
vice occupations are difficult to automate as they require direct physical proximity
or flexible interpersonal communication, and they rely on dexterity. At the same
time, they do not need problem solving or managerial skills to be carried out,
hence there are limited opportunities for complementarity.
Despite manual non-routine tasks that comprise many of the unskilled jobs
are not directly influenced by technological progress, its impact in other parts
of the economy is likely to lead to a rise in employment in these kind of works.
wage-setting in particular, which can affect employment opportunities of different kind of workers
(DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Card, 2001; Lemieux, 2007).
7See Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for an extensive analysis of the limits of the SBTC hypothesis
(the “canonical model”) in this context.
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Goos et al. (2007) apply Baumol’s (1967) predictions - a shift of employment
from technologically progressive industries (e.g. manufacturing) to non-progressive
industries (e.g. services) in order to keep the balance of output in different products
- to explain the increase in low-paid service jobs and employment falls in routine
middling jobs. Productivity growth favours the increase in output of goods which,
under imperfect substitution between goods and services, ultimately leads to an
increase in the demand for service outputs and employment (Autor and Dorn,
2009). In a closed economy, this can lead to the displacement of middle-skilled
workers towards service occupations as a side effect. Because routine and non-
routine tasks are q-complements in production, the net increase of routine tasks
input, due to an inflow of computer capital, raises the marginal productivity of
non-routine tasks. According to the ALM theoretical framework, marginal middle-
skilled workers who mainly perform routine tasks are induced to supply non-routine
tasks with a higher marginal productivity. Under the assumption that the relative
comparative advantage of middle-skilled workers is greater in low than high-skilled
tasks, Autor et al. (2011) interpret employment growth in low-paid services as
an implication of the substitution of skills across tasks (i.e. shifts of middle-paid
workers towards low-paying occupations).
1.3 Data
The data that we use come from three UK Skills Surveys of 1997, 2001 and 2006.
The main aim of these surveys is to provide an analysis of the level and distribu-
tion of skills being used in British workplaces. At each wave, information on job
characteristics and working conditions are collected: these include details on the
intensity of the tasks being performed, the degree of repetition of the activities
carried out and the use of computers or computerised equipment in the workplace.
Additional information on wages, educational qualification levels and past jobs are
available, as well as other demographic variables.
The three repeated cross-sections cover altogether 14,717 workers (men and
women), respectively 2,467 in 1997, 4,470 in 2001 and 7,780 in 2006. Sampling
weights adjusted for response rate are used throughout the analysis8. We restrict
8See Felstead et al. (2007) for further details.
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our analysis to individuals aged 20 to 60 and we drop from the third wave Northern
Ireland and Highlands and Islands respondents due to their exclusion in 1997 and
2001, reducing the observations in 2006 to 6,704. We classify occupations according
to the ISCO-88 nomenclature at the three-digit level. We retain only those occu-
pations which appear in all the three years with at least 5 observations, reducing
the total number from 104 to 67. At this point the average number of individual
observations in each occupation was around 34 in 1997, 63 in 2001 and 88 in 2006.
Differently from the US O*NET database, whose original purpose was an ad-
ministrative evaluation by Employment Services offices of the fit between workers
and occupations, the UK Skills Surveys were conducted exclusively for research9.
In the O*NET, analysts at the Department of Labor assign scores to each task
according to standardised guidelines to describe their importance within each oc-
cupation. Spitz-Oener (2006) claims that this process encourages experts to under-
estimate true changes on job content. Although the UK Skills Surveys present a
higher level of subjectivity, this feature has the advantage of giving a more precise
idea of the tasks performed within each occupation. Autor and Handel (2009),
who use a similar type of survey to derive individual task measures (the Princeton
Data Improvement Initiative survey, PDII), prove that their data have a greater
explanatory power for wages than those derived from the O*NET.
We derive three tasks measures using 35 questions on job content. At each
wave, every respondent is asked how much a particular activity is important for
his/her job on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (“not at all/does not apply) to 5
(“essential”). All these variables in Likert scale are converted into increasing car-
dinal scale from 0 (“not at all/does not apply) to 4 (“essential”). We manually
assign the different activities performed by workers to three broad categories: the
first two, analytical and interpersonal, represent non-manual tasks (including re-
spectively 25 and 6 activities); the third comprises manual tasks (4 activities) (see
Appendix A.1 for a complete list). The Cronbach’s scale reliability coefficient for
the internal consistency of the three groups is respectively 0.93, 0.72 and 0.79.
Examples of analytical tasks are: problem solving, analysing complex problems
in depth and doing calculations using advanced mathematical or statistical pro-
9The study was directed by the following researchers: Francis Green, Alan Felstead, Duncan
Gallie and Ying Zhou.
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cedures. Among interpersonal tasks we include persuading or influencing others,
selling a product or service and counseling, advising or caring for customers or
clients. Finally, we consider as manual those tasks such as working for long peri-
ods on physical activities or carrying, pushing and pulling heavy objects. For each
one of the three categories above mentioned (analytical, interpersonal and manual)
a principal component analysis is performed10. Further details on how the principal
component analysis was conducted can be found in Appendix AA, together with
the derivation of all the other variables used in the empirical analysis.
We take into account an additional dimension related to the possibility of tasks
being easily replicated by machines and readily subject to automation. Individuals
in the UK Skills Surveys were asked the following question about the frequency
of routine activities they performed within their job: “How often does your job
involve carrying out short, repetitive tasks?”. To this item they could respond
on a 5-point scale ranging from “never” to “always” (intermediate answers were
“rarely”, “sometime” and “often”). Arguing that the a priori identification of rou-
tine activities is difficult, Green (2012) considers as such only repetitive manual
activities. The author obtains a repetitive physical skill index by combining the
physical skill measure (derived exactly from the same items of our manual dimen-
sion) with the question on task repetition.
1.4 Job Polarisation: Preliminary Evidence
In this section we investigate the phenomenon of employment polarisation as a
preliminary step for the subsequent analysis. We compute, on the basis of the
number of workers, employment shares for each occupation and their changes over
time. We then rank occupations according to their initial median hourly wage.
Finally we plot the percentage point change in employment share against the
(log) median wage. Figure 1.1 shows that, between 1997 and 2006, employment
in low and high-paying occupations increased while it decreased in the middle
of the distribution. We can clearly detect a U-shaped curve in the evolution of
employment shares when occupations are ranked according to their average wage.
10 Previous studies use 32 items to generate eight skill indexes, identified by an exploratory
factor analysis, as average scores from the responses.
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Figure 1.1
Employment shares growth in Britain (1997-2006) by median hourly wage
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Notes: Scatter plot and quadratic prediction curve. The dimension of each circle
corresponds to the number of observations within each ISCO-88 three-digit occupa-
tion in 1997; the gray area shows 95% confidence interval. Employment shares are
measured in terms of workers. Source: UK Skill Surveys.
To test in a more rigorous way employment polarisation we follow Goos and
Manning (2007) estimating models of the quadratic form:
∆Ek = α0 + α1 log(wk,0) + α2 log(wk,0)
2 + εk (1.1)
where ∆Ek is the change in employment shares of occupation k between the
initial and the final year considered and log(wk,0) is the initial log median wage of
occupation k. A U-shaped relationship between employment growth and the initial
level of wages corresponds to a negative linear term and a positive quadratic term.
Table 1.1 shows the results of OLS regressions using initial number of observations
in each occupation as weights to ensure that results are not biased by compositional
changes in small occupations. Coefficients have the expected signs and are all
statistically significant at the 1% level. Coefficients are also increasing in absolute
value the longer the period considered, as well as the adjusted R-square. Because
employment growth at the lower tail of the distribution could be linked to part-
10 Chapter 1. Job Polarisation in Britain from a Task-Based Perspective
Table 1.1
OLS regressions for employment polarisation analysis
Dependent variable
Change in employment share
1997-2001 1997-2006
(1) (2)
(log) median hourly wage 1997 -6.820*** -9.402***
(2.363) (3.389)
sq. (log) median hourly wage 1997 1.773*** 2.406***
(0.597) (0.854)
constant 6.185*** 8.738**
(2.299) (3.314)
N 67 67
Adj. R-square 0.161 0.156
F 4.545 3.994
Notes: Each occupation is weighted by the initial number of observations. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, significance levels *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05,*p<
0.10. Source: UK Skills Surveys.
time rather than full time jobs, we further test the same model using weekly hours
worked11 as a measure for employment shares rather than expressing them in terms
of bodies. Results are robust to this alternative specification. The phenomenon
of employment polarisation is also robust to the use of the mean instead of the
median.
We also analyze polarisation by defining occupation wage quintiles. Quintiles
are created ranking occupations by their initial median wage and then aggregating
them into five equally-sized groups. Each group contains almost the same per-
centage of employment in the initial year12. We plot in Figure 1.2 the change in
the employment share from 1997 to 2006 by occupation wage quintiles. The pe-
riod from 1997 to 2006 is characterised by a marked polarisation in employment
growth: there is a rapid employment growth at the first quintile, a decline in the
employment shares of middle-skilled jobs and increasing employment shares at the
11We decided to drop those individuals reporting negative values, zero or more than 80 hours
per week.
12This methodology has been first applied by Wrigth and Dwyer (2003). It is not possible to
create groups which contain exactly the same percentage of employment since occupations are
defined as inseparable units.
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Figure 1.2
Evolution of employment changes between 1997 and 2006 by occupation
wage quintiles
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Occupation wage quintile
Notes: Occupation wage quintiles are based on three-digit ISCO-88 median wages
in 1997. Source: Uk Skill Surveys.
top of the wage distribution (fifth quintile).
Next, we examine whether changes in the labour market’s quantity side find
their natural counterpart in changes in the price side, as the United States. We
test with OLS regression the correspondence between changes in occupational em-
ployment shares and changes in occupational wages between 1997-2006. We find
that the link between changes in employment shares and changes in (log) median
wages is not statistically significant: we estimate β=0.012 (t-value: 1.50)13. These
findings suggest that in Britain, between 1997 and 2006, wages did not experience
the same polarised pattern of employment shares. As a robustness check for our
findings on the absence of wage polarisation, we follow Kampelmann and Rycx
(2011) estimating the following model:
∆log(wk) = α0 + α1 log(wk,0) + α2 log(wk,0)
2 + εk (1.2)
13Our regression includes a constant and is weighted by the number of individuals within an
occupational group in 1997.
12 Chapter 1. Job Polarisation in Britain from a Task-Based Perspective
Table 1.2
OLS regressions for wage polarisation analysis, ASHE data
Change in (log) median
wage, 1997-2006
(log) median hourly wage 1997 0.009
(0.256)
sq. (log) median hourly wage 1997 -0.016
(0.059)
constant 0.303
(0.260)
N 67
Adj. R-square 0.021
F 1.190
Notes: Results are based on the same 67 occupations selected for the UK Skills
Survey analysis. Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), 1997
and 2006.
Because of possible wage measurement error in our main source which would
cause attenuation bias in the estimates, we prefer to use data from the Annual
Survey of Hours and Earnings14. The ASHE provides information about earnings
and hours worked for employees by sex and full-time/part-time workers in all
industries and occupations. Given that the ASHE is based on a one per cent
sample of employees taken from payroll records collected by the HM Revenue &
Customs, we consider it to be a more reliable and accurate source to analyze the
evolution of gross hourly pay at the occupation level. Table 1.2 reports estimates
only for the same 67 occupations that are considered in the UK Skill Surveys.
Results obtained from this additional dataset confirm that there is no evidence of
wage polarisation at the occupational level for the period 1997-2006.
1.5 Employment Changes and Task Intensities
To interpret previous findings on the phenomenon of job polarisation in Britain,
we follow a task-based approach exploiting information on the activities carried
14Available at: http://data.gov.uk/dataset/annual survey of hours and earnings. We manu-
ally map the SOC nomenclature into the ISCO-88 three-digit classification to allow comparability
between results.
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Table 1.3
Correlations among task measures and the education variable
Analytical Interpersonal Manual Routine Education
Analytical 1
Interpersonal 0.664 1
Manual -0.501 -0.531 1
Routine -0.675 -0.578 0.497 1
Education 0.736 0.528 -0.571 -0.705 1
Notes: Correlations are computed at the 3-digit occupational level. Source: UK Skills
Surveys.
out on workplaces. All workers perform a wide range of tasks but they do it with
different intensities. This means that occupations are not uniquely associated with
one single type of task; still, they can be classified as predominantly non-manual or
manual according to the intensity of analytical, interpersonal and manual activi-
ties. Likewise, occupations can be categorised as routine or non-routine depending
on how much the required activities are repetitive.
Table 1.3 presents the correlation among the task and routine measures and the
education variable at the occupation level. The manual dimension is negatively cor-
related with the analytical and interpersonal measures and the education variable.
Education is instead positively correlated with the two non-manual dimensions.
The routine measure is negatively correlated with the analytical and interpersonal
dimension and with the level of educational attainment and positively with the
manual measure15.
We proceed with our analysis aggregating the 67 occupations so far considered
at the ISCO-88 two-digit level. This aggregation offers a clear interpretation of
the tasks content of the occupations that mainly contributed to the polarisation of
the employment structure. Table 1.4 presents the 24 two-digit occupations ranked
in ascending order by their median wage in 199716, which is reported in column
15Results are similar to those reported in Green (2012) who explores at the individual level the
correlation of nine job skill indexes with the education variable, but using the required education
level of the job and not worker’s actual highest qualification. We additionally provide an estimate
of the correlation between the routine and the manual measures.
16The high value of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (0.93) suggests that the wage
ranking was fairly stable over time.
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1, and the percentage point change in their employment share during the period
1997-2006. Table 1.3 also shows the mean of the educational attainment in 1997,
computed from a three-level education variable ranging from 1 (low-skilled) to 3
(high-skilled).
We draw on the work of Goos et al. (2009) to classify these occupations into
three major groups which we label as low, middling and high-paying17. This group-
ing reflects the theoretical classification of the ALM model with service and elemen-
tary occupations being the low-paying, productive and administrative occupations
the middling-paying, professional and managerial the high-paying. Column 1 to
4 of Table 1.5 report the average values of the task measures for each occupa-
tion. Matching these figures with the statistics on changes in employment shares,
we have a clear picture of the task content of the occupations which determined
employment polarisation between 1997 and 2006.
1.5.1 Non-manual and Manual Dimensions
Among the group of high-paying occupations, “Corporate Managers” (ISCO 12),
“Life science and health associate professionals” (ISCO 32) and “Other Profession-
als” (ISCO 24) are those that experienced the most significant employment growth.
All these three major occupations score higher on the non-manual dimension, an
average of analytical and interpersonal measures, than on the manual one.
Within middling-paying occupations, those losing more employment share be-
tween 1997 and 2006 were “Office clerks” (ISCO 41), scoring on average higher on
the non-manual dimension; “Metal, machinery and trade workers” (ISCO 72) and
“Machine operators and assemblers” (ISCO 82), scoring respectively 0.78 and 0.66
in the manual measure.
17 Our groups include respectively 6, 10 and 8 occupations. Ferna´ndez-Mac´ıas (2012) criticises
the methodological strategy developed by Goos et al. (2009), claiming that a division in even
groups would not lead to conclude that there was a pervasive polarisation in Europe. Our findings
for Britain are instead robust to an alternative classification in three even groups, with the middle
group still declining in terms of employment shares and the two extreme groups increasing.
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Concerning the group of the lowest paying occupations, four out of six have
growing employment shares. Those occupations with a positive percentage point
change over 1997-2006 are low-paying services, such as “Personal and protective
service workers” (ISCO 51) and “Salespersons, models and demonstrators” (ISCO
52) and low-paying elementary occupations, such as “Sales and services elementary
occupations” (ISCO 91) and “Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing
and transport” (ISCO 93). Within the elementary occupations (ISCO 91 and 93)
the categories growing more were “Messengers, porters, doorkeepers” (ISCO 915,
+2.19 percentage points change) which can be classified as private consumer ser-
vices, and “Transport labourers and freight handlers” (ISCO 933, +1.27 percentage
points change) which are instead considered business services. Our findings confirm
that the increase of employment at the lower tail of the wage distribution is mainly
driven by a job expansion in the service sector. The task content of these jobs is
mixed, with elementary occupations being predominantly manual and service oc-
cupations scoring higher in the interpersonal dimension. This is in line with the
fact that low-paid service jobs rely both on physical proximity and interpersonal
communication, therefore are not directly affected by technological progress.
1.5.2 Routine Intensity
After having classified the occupations in manual and non-manual, we take into
account an additional dimension related to the extent to which the involved ac-
tivities are repetitive. The ALM theoretical framework split the routine dimension
into two components: routine cognitive tasks (for example documenting or pro-
cessing information) and routine manual (for instance the importance of repetitive
motions and physical activities). However, the single question on repetitiveness in
the UK Skills Survey does not allow this decomposition. Using O*Net data on
task measures at the occupational level18, we find that that the correlation be-
tween the UK Skills Survey routine measure and the O*Net routine manual and
cognitive scales is respectively 0.62 and 0.33 (see Table 1.6). One can see that,
despite our routine measure is more strongly related to the manual rather than
18 U.S. Census 2000 codes in the O*net data are matched to the International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). We thank David Autor for making the data publicly
available at: http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor/data.
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Table 1.6
Correlation between UK Skills Surveys routine measure and O*Net
routine-cognitive and routine-manual indexes
Skill Surveys O*Net O*Net
routine routine-cognitive routine-manual
Skill Surveys routine 1
O*Net routine-cognitive 0.325 1
O*Net routine-manual 0.617 0.339 1
Notes: Correlations are computed at the 3-digit occupation level. Source: UK Skills Surveys
and O*Net data.
the cognitive O*Net routine dimension, we still observe a positive correlation also
for this second case. Using data from the Princeton Data Improvement Initiative
survey (PDII), Autor and Handel (2009, p. 20) find instead that their measure of
routine activity correlates positively with the O*Net routine manual scale (0.36)
and negatively with the O*Net routine cognitive scale (-0.22), concluding that it
placed far greater weight on the manual rather than cognitive dimension of repeti-
tiveness. The question on repetitiveness in the UK Skill Survey is almost identical
to that included in the Princeton Data Improvement Initiative survey (PDII).
In light of the above findings, we analyze the routine measure among the oc-
cupations previously considered. As expected, high-paying managerial and pro-
fessional occupations (ISCO 12, 24, 32) are predominantly characterised by non-
routine activities; on the contrary, declining middling-paying occupations such as
ISCO 41 or 82 mainly involve routine tasks. These results are compatible with the
ALM routinisation hypothesis which clearly predicts that the impact of comput-
erisation caused a substantial substitution with routine tasks typical of middling-
paying occupations and strong complementarity with non-routine tasks performed
high-paying occupations.
Surprisingly, low-paying occupations are mostly routine. However, one caveat
must be expressed. The repetitiveness dimension could have been interpreted by
respondents as mundane and tedious rather than mechanistic and readily subject
to automation. This is the reason why also Autor and Handel (2009), who eval-
uate this dimension using a similar question on repetitiveness, find that service
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Table 1.7
OLS regression of changes in employment share and the initial level of
routine intensity
Dependent variable
Change in employment share 1997-2006
(1) (2)
Routine intensity 1997 -1.716 -3.076**
(1.421) (1.441)
N 67 52
Adj. R-square 0.028 0.128
F 1.459 4.557
Notes: All regressions include a constant. Column 1 shows results for all occupations; column
2 reports estimates excluding the low-paying ones. Robust standard errors between brack-
ets.Source: UK Skills Surveys.
occupations score really high in the routine measure. Similarly, Kampelmann and
Rycz (2011) suggest that in Germany gains in employment shares at the low-
wage occupations are linked to low-skilled services both routine and non-routine.
Their definition of routine tasks is also based on whether a job is characterised
by monotony of procedures. These findings should therefore be interpreted care-
fully in light of the above reasoning and not considered in contrast to the ALM
theoretical framework.
Table 1.7 present results of OLS regressions of changes in employment shares
between 1997-2006 and the initial level of routine intensity for each occupation.
Panel (a) show estimates using all the 67 three-digit occupations, while panel (b)
considers only middling and high-paying occupations. As expected, in both cases
there is a negative relationship between the two variables. However, the coefficient
is statistically significant only in the second case, possibly because of a misguided
interpretation of the routine question by low-paid workers.
1.6 Technological Change and Routine Tasks
Similarly to Green (2012), we analyze the relationship between computerisation
and routine task inputs at the occupational level creating a pseudo-panel. Un-
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like previous studies using the same data, we exclude from the analysis workers
in low-paid service and elementary occupations for which the ALM theoretical
framework predicts limited opportunities for substitution or complementarity. We
deem that this exclusion is not only relevant from a theoretical standpoint but
also from an empirical one, given our findings on the repetitiveness dimension in
these occupations.
Furthermore, we decide to evaluate the routine index by itself and not combined
with the manual one as in Green (2012). In the previous section we showed that the
routine measure in the UK Skill Surveys is more strongly related to the manual
rather than the cognitive measures available in the O*Net data. However, after
dropping low-paying occupations, the correlation coefficient between our routine
measure and the routine cognitive O*Net variable increases substantially from 0.33
to 0.57, while the other essentially stays constant (from 0.61 to 0.65). It is therefore
reasonable to assume that, when testing the ALM model on those occupations for
which there are clear theoretical predictions, the basic routine measure available in
our data well captures both the manual and the cognitive dimension of repetitive
tasks, despite we are treating two factors as one.
We collapse the variables of interest at the 3-digit ISCO-88 occupation level,
specifying the following model:
T¯jt = βC¯jt +
T−1∑
t=1
θt + δj + ε¯jt (1.3)
where T¯jt is the routine task measure at the occupation level at time t, C¯jt is
the variable capturing computer intensity (see Appendix AB for further details on
how it is derived) in occupation j at time t, θt is a set of year effects and δj is
a set of occupation effects. Time fixed effects control for omitted variables which
are constant across occupations but evolve over time; occupation fixed effects are
included to control for omitted variables that vary across occupations but not over
time.
Table 1.8 reports the estimates using fixed effects with occupation cell size as
weights. We find that technology is significantly negatively related with routine
task inputs. Since low-paying occupations were excluded from the analysis, the
negative impact of computerisation is only associated with routine middle-paid
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Table 1.8
Impact of computer adoption on task measures
Dependent variable
Routine Repetitive physical Analytical Interpersonal
Computer use -0.151* -0.170*** 0.225*** 0.193***
(0.076) (0.063) (0.050) (0.061)
N 156 156 156 156
R-squared 0.860 0.955 0.932 0.948
F(Year dummies) 2.83 1.51 6.81 0.06
Notes: Fixed-effects estimates at the 3-digit occupation level are weighted by cell size. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Source: UK Skills Surveys.
jobs. As Column 2 shows, interacting the repetitive and the manual indexes im-
proves the estimate significantly. However, this would imply to classify as routine
only repetitive physical activities as in Green (2012) and we are not imposing this
restriction. Although one important limitation is that we cannot disentangle the
effect of computerisation on the routine cognitive and manual components (typical
of clerical and production work, respectively), it is reasonable to think that both
aspects are embedded in the basic measure.
For the sake of completeness, we estimate equation (3) also for analytical and
interpersonal tasks. This is done to investigate whether non-manual tasks, which
mainly refer to those individuals working in professional, managerial and creative
non-routine occupations, are complements with computer use. Our findings are in
line with the positive effect of computer technologies on the use of greater generic
skills (such as literacy, numeracy, influencing and self-planning) found in Green
(2009 and 2012). This is not surprising since the exclusion of low-paying occupa-
tions is not suppose to affect results for the high-paying ones.
1.7 The Displacement of Middle-paid Workers
In this section we explore the occupational mobility of middle-paid (skilled) work-
ers19. Increasing demand for low-paid services can be considered as a side-effect
19The terms paid and skilled are interchangeable in our context.
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Table 1.9
Occupational mobility by educational group
Occupational change
1992-1997 1996-2001
Education (1) (2)
Low 64.57 71.21
Medium 58.39 70.88
High 57.01 54.21
N 727 1,776
Notes: The table shows the percentages of workers who changed
occupation among those with the same educational attainment.
Source: UK Skills Surveys.
of the impact of technological change on other parts of the economy. In a closed
economy context, this demand is compensated by labour supply shifts of middle-
skilled workers performing routine activities, easily substituted by machines, which
ultimately lead to employment growth in low-paid jobs. ALM model predicts that
marginal routine workers are induced to reallocate their labour supply to non-
routine intense occupations.
We use information on past jobs for 2,503 national workers20. In 1997 and 2001
respondents were asked whether their historical job (5 years before) was the same
as the current job (same employer). Workers also declared whether the job was
in the same occupation or not. We compute the percentages of high, middle and
low-skilled workers who changed occupation, given the total number of high, mid-
dle and low-skilled individuals in the sample indicating an historical occupational
code. Looking at Table 1.9, we observe that middle-skilled workers became increas-
ingly more mobile over time (+12.49 percentage points, against -2.8 of high-skilled
and +6.64 of low-skilled).
Next, we want to establish where the displaced middle-paid workers moved
by looking at the direction of their shifts, either towards low or high-paying oc-
cupations. Given that each survey covers exclusively workers, we can analyze only
20The UK Skills Surveys contain information on ethnicity which we use as a proxy to distinguish
natives from foreign-born, given the absence of a variable on nationality. This restriction is
minimal as a low number of observations is dropped.
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downward and upward mobility and not flows into unemployment or inactivity.
Our inquiry builds on the analysis of transition probability matrices21. Accord-
ing to the economic theory, we should see over time an increasing probability of
middle-income workers to move towards low-paid services. In 2006 the employment
history question was related to the past industry and not occupation, hence it is
not comparable to the other waves. We decide to integrate our main source with
an additional dataset to extend the period of analysis. Using the BHPS (British
Household Panel Survey), we investigate occupational mobility from 2001 to 2006
after having applied to the data all the necessary restrictions to obtain a compa-
rable sample. From Table 1.10 one can see that the probability that workers in
middling-paying occupations did not change group decreased (from 0.69 to 0.58),
while it increased for those in low and high-paying occupations (respectively from
0.58 to 0.69, and from 0.73 to 0.81).
We further check whether these shifts were due to a self-selection process rather
than a forced displacement. According to the Roy (1951) model of wage determina-
tion and self-selection, workers chose occupations endogenously moving into those
with the highest average reward to their bundle of tasks. If this were the case we
would expect that middle-paid displaced workers earn more that the average wage
of the selected low or high-paying occupation. Among those workers who moved
out middling-paying occupations (i.e. 1,030, of which 654 from BHPS), we find
that 74.57% of those moving upwards and 57.81% of those moving downwards
earn an hourly wage lower than the average. While the former figure could sim-
ply reflect differences in returns from educational attainments, the latter seems
to indicate that displaced middle-paid workers are not well rewarded despite a
reasonable comparative advantage.
Our findings suggest that there was a forced reallocation of middle-paid work-
ers’ labour supply. However, these workers did not predominantly move towards
low-paid services. The probability of moving towards high-paying occupations in-
creased too. Our interpretation is that explanations of the significant job expansion
21In a transition probability matrix each cell corresponds to the transition probability from one
state to another given by: pij = Pr(Xt = j|Xt = i). This is computed as: pij = Nij/
∑n
j=1Nij ,
where Nij is the number of workers changing from state i to j (the cell count) and
∑n
j=1Nij the
total number of workers in a certain occupation group (the row count).
24 Chapter 1. Job Polarisation in Britain from a Task-Based Perspective
Table 1.10
Transition probability matrix
Occupation
in 1997
Occupation
in 1992
Low Middling High Total
Low 0.58 0.26 0.17 1
Middling 0.14 0.69 0.17 1
High 0.08 0.19 0.73 1
Occupation
in 2001
Occupation
in 1996
Low Middling High Total
Low 0.56 0.29 0.14 1
Middling 0.19 0.60 0.21 1
High 0.07 0.17 0.75 1
Occupation
in 2006
Occupation
in 2001
Low Middling High Total
Low 0.69 0.14 0.17 1
Middling 0.17 0.58 0.25 1
High 0.06 0.12 0.81 1
Notes: Each cell corresponds to the transition probability form one state to another.
Occupations are grouped into low, middling and high-paying. N=739 in 1997, 1,785
in 2001 and 3,645 in 2006. Source: UK Skills Surveys and BHPS.
at the lower tail of the distribution entirely based on the displacement of national
middle-skilled workers are not fully satisfactory.
One has to consider that since the mid-1990s immigration flows increased
sharply in the United Kingdom22. Apart from the concentration in very high-
skilled jobs, notably health professionals, there has been an increasing tendency
over time for immigrants to be predominant also in jobs at the bottom end of the
occupational classification. Nickell and Saleheen (2009) show that the ratio be-
tween recent immigrants and natives has increased by proportionately more in low
skilled elementary and operative occupations over the last two decades. Oesch and
22Statistics on international migration flows for the UK are available
at:http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/population/migration/international-migration.
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Rodr´ıguez Mene´s (2011), by resorting to an exercise in counterfactuals, find that
between 1991 and 2008 the expansion in the low-paid occupations of the lowest
quintile in Britain was mainly determined by job growth among foreign-born and
not national workers.
1.8 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we contribute to the debate on labour market polarisation in Britain
using UK task data to measure the job content of occupations. We confirm that
employment in Britain experienced a polarising trend at the occupational level
between 1997 and 2006 but there is no evidence of a similar course in wages. Our
sample suggests that jobs in high and low-paying occupations increased, while em-
ployment shares decreased in the middle of the distribution.
We interpret the evolution of occupational employment from a task-based per-
spective exploring ALM model’s predictions. We find that high-paying occupa-
tions which increased the most can be safely classified as non-manual non-routine,
while middling-paying occupations which have lost significant employment shares
are predominantly routine (both manual and non-manual). The task content of
low-paying occupations is more mixed, with elementary occupations being pre-
dominantly manual and service occupations scoring higher in the interpersonal
dimension, and the routine dimension appears more difficult to evaluate. Still, we
find that changes in employment shares are negatively related to the initial level
of routine intensity.
Similarly to Green (2012), we formally test the association between routine task
inputs and technology in workplaces, but we decide to exclude from the analysis
low-paying occupations for which the ALM model predicts limited opportunities
for substitution or complementarity. Moreover, we do not constrain our routine
measure to represent only repetitive physical activities. From a comparison with
O*Net data, we show that the routine measure in the UK Skills Surveys well
captures both the manual and the cognitive routine dimension once low-paying
occupations are dropped. The negative impact of computerisation that we find is
therefore likely to be associated both with manual and cognitive routine middling-
paying jobs, although we are not able to disentangle the effect.
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Finally, we exploit retrospective questions on past jobs to evaluate the extent
to which the displacement of middle-paid workers, caused by an adverse impact
of technological advances, contributed to the employment growth at the lower
tail of the distribution. We find that workers in middling-paying occupations be-
came more mobile over time. However, they did not predominantly move towards
low-paying occupations. This is consistent with the argument that the surge of
low-skilled immigrants in Britain from 1997 onwards played a major role in the
expansion of low-paid jobs.
Chapter 2
How does immigration affect
natives’ task-specialisation?
Evidence from the United
Kingdom.∗
2.1 Introduction
Net immigration inflows into the UK have increased sharply since 1997, reaching
their maximum in 2005 with the EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries and falling afterwards (Dustmann et al., 2008; Wadsworth, 2012).
Figure 2.1 shows that since the mid-1990s the percentage of immigrants in the UK
working age population has been rising from around 8.5 to almost 13 percent in
2006. Unlike the US or some continental European countries (e.g. Italy or Spain),
immigration to Britain in the past has not been predominantly concentrated at the
bottom of the skill distribution. Many immigrants are indeed highly-qualified and
find a job in high-paying occupations, as it is the case for health professionals. Yet,
major changes in the distribution of immigrants from the mid-1990s happened at
the lower end of the occupational classification (Nickell and Saleheen, 2009).
∗I thank the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) for hosting me during my re-
search. I am also deeply grateful to Dr Joanne Lindley for her valuable comments and suggestions
on earlier drafts.
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Figure 2.1
Percentage of immigrants in UK’s working age population
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Notes: Percentage of foreign-born in working age population 16-65. Source: Labour
Force Survey (LFS) and author’s calculations.
Today immigrants are indeed over-represented both in the very high-skilled
and very low-skilled occupations (Wadsworth, 2012). This is shown by Figure 2.2
which compares the occupational distribution of immigrants between 1997 and
2006. As one would note, there was a relatively more marked increase in the pres-
ence of immigrants at the bottom of the occupational classification, particularly
in operatives, service and sale workers and elementary occupations1. The increas-
ing presence of immigrants in low-paying occupations is even more marked when
considering only recent immigrants (i.e. those with at most five years of residence
in the UK) (see Figure 2.3)2.
1For the sake of completeness, Figure 2.2 includes also the ISCO-88 category “Skilled agricul-
tural and fishery workers”, although employment in this occupation occurs only in small numbers
compared to the yearly average across all occupations.
2Our analysis follows Nickell and Saleheen (2009) who look at immigration across occupations
distinguishing between all and new immigrants.
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Figure 2.2
Percentage of immigrants by occupation
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Notes: ISCO-88 occupations are ranked according to their initial 1997 mean hourly
wage, from the highest (left) to the lowest (right). Source: Labour Force Survey
(LFS) and author’s calculations.
Figure 2.3
Percentage of recent immigrants by occupation
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Notes: ISCO-88 occupations are ranked according to their initial 1997 mean hourly
wage, from the highest (left) to the lowest (right). Recent immigrants are defined as
those with at most five years of residence in the UK. Source: Labour Force Survey
(LFS) and author’s calculations.
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By resorting to a counterfactual exercise, Oesch and Rodr´ıguez Mene´s (2011)
confirm that the job expansion in low-paid jobs that Britain experienced from the
late 1990s was mainly determined by surges of immigration. These changes could
be reasonably explained both by downgrading of immigrants upon arrival, who end
up competing with lower educated native workers because of language or cultural
barriers (Dustmann et al., 2008), and recent high inflows of low skilled immigrants
due to the EU enlargement in 2004 (Nickell and Saleheen, 2009).
One major concern for immigrant-receiving countries are the effects that foreign-
born supply has on local labour market. Previous literature considers traditional
labour market outcomes such as wages, employment, unemployment and partici-
pation rate. Here we adopt a different perspective introduced by Peri and Sparber
(2009) who investigate the effect of immigration on the task specialisation of na-
tives. This paper aims at evaluating whether natives, who are assumed to have
a comparative advantage relative to immigrants in communication as opposed to
manual tasks, are induced to specialise in communication-intensive jobs in response
to immigration inflows. In light of the above described recent developments of im-
migration patterns in Britain, we focus on the bottom end of the occupational skill
distribution by looking at the impact of less-skilled foreign-born on similarly edu-
cated native workers. In this paper not only do we contribute to the literature on
migration in the UK by applying a novel task-based approach, but we also make a
methodological progress with respect to previous studies on immigration and task-
specialisation in European countries by measuring the task content of occupations
from national survey data, instead of relying on US sources. Our main empirical
findings show that in the UK natives respond to increasing immigration by shifting
their task supply and providing more communication relative to manual tasks. By
instrumenting the share of foreign-born workers, we show that the positive effect
on the relative task supply is plausibly causal. Results obtained for the UK are
consistent with previous literature for the US, Spain and Europe.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an overview
of the relevant literature. Section 3 outlines the theoretical model of comparative
advantages in task performance developed by Peri and Sparber (2009), on which
we draw heavily. Section 4 discusses the empirical specification and the identifica-
tion strategy. Section 5 describes the data used and the construction of our main
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variables. Section 6 reports results from the empirical analysis. Finally, in Section 7
we assess how the effects of immigration on natives’ task specialisation vary across
demographic groups and we perform a sensitivity analysis by utilising alternative
task variables. Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
There is a recent but growing literature on the benefits and costs of immigration
inflows in the UK. Some papers use a spatial correlation, or inter-area, approach
which consists in slicing the labour market by area within a country and then
relying on regional variations to identify the effects of immigration on labour mar-
ket outcomes (e.g Dustmann et al., 2005); others follow the so-called national
approach which implies that the national labour market is divided by skill group
(education-age cells) (e.g Manacorda et al., 2012). This second strategy was pro-
posed to overcome the problem that labour markets are not closed economies and
natives are free to move in or out. However, this approach depends on the as-
sumption that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes within pre-defined
skill categories, which does not hold if immigrants considerably downgrade after
arrival, as shown by Dustmann et al. (2013) in their analysis for Britain3.
Overall, this literature finds that immigration had no appreciable effect on the
average wages and employment of native-born workers (see Wadsworth, 2012, for
a review)4. Dustmann et al. (2005) find no strong evidence that immigration has
overall effects on aggregate employment, participation, unemployment and wages
at the regional level. Lemos and Portes (2008) contribute to the UK migration
literature by looking at the effects of the 2004 EU enlargement. They find mod-
est effects of migration from Central and Eastern European Countries on regional
labour markets, with no significant fall in wages nor rise in claimant unemployment.
Nickell and Saleheen (2009) refine previous studies incorporating the occupational
dimension into a regional analysis of immigration in Britain. They find a small neg-
3Dustmann et al. (2013) introduce a novel approach analysing the impact of immigration
along the distribution of native wages, rather than on wages of different skill groups, without
imposing any ex-ante restriction on where immigrants compete with natives.
4This evidence is consistent with findings for the US (see Borjas, 2003; Borjas and Katz, 2007;
Card, 2001, 2005; Card and Lewis, 2007).
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ative impact of immigration on average occupational wages in the semi/unskilled
services sector.
As emphasised by Ottaviano and Peri (2006, 2008), the effects of immigration
significantly depend on the degree of substitution between natives and foreign-
born workers with similar observable characteristics. If immigrants and natives
within the same educational group do not possess the same skills, they specialise
in different tasks and therefore different occupations. Ottaviano and Peri (2006,
2008) explain the minimal impact of immigration on local labour markets in light
of the fact that natives and immigrants do not compete for the same job. Peri and
Sparber (2009) advance this literature by focusing on workers with little educa-
tional attainment (i.e. those without a college education) in the US. Less-educated
immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes in production: the former have a
comparative advantage in occupations requiring simple physical (“manual”) tasks,
mainly because of limited language proficiency, lack of specific human capital skills
and imperfect knowledge of the local labour markets; the latter have an advantage
in occupations which require the use of interactive and communication (“complex”)
tasks. The authors provide empirical evidence that less educated immigrants tend
to specialise in physical demanding jobs and at the same time that natives respond
to immigration by increasing their supply of complex tasks.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two studies which explore these
findings outside the US. Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2011), by looking at
Spanish data and adding in the gender dimension to the empirical specification
of Peri and Sparber (2009), show that both native men (women) relocate to jobs
with a higher interactive or communication content in response to an increase
in male (female) immigration. D’Amuri and Peri (2012) analyze the impact of
immigration on 15 European countries and explore its variation in light of the dif-
ferences in labour markets’ institutional characteristics. Again, they establish that
higher immigration pushes natives to occupations with higher skill contents, and
that this process is stronger in countries with low levels of employment protection
legislation. The purpose of this article is to fill the gap in evidence for Britain.
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2.3 Theoretical Model
In this section we outline the Peri and Sparber (2009) model of comparative ad-
vantages in task performance. In our analysis we entirely follow its predictions and
empirical specification.
Assume that an open economy produces a final good Y using intermediate
inputs YL and YH, which are produced by less and high-educated workers respec-
tively. Given that the focus is on workers with little educational attainment, Peri
and Sparber (2009) simply assume that YH is produced according to a linear tech-
nology equal to the total supply of highly-educated workers, that is YH = H. On
the contrary, YL requires the combination of two different type of tasks, manual
(M) and communication (C), according to the following CES function:
YL =
[
βLM
θL−1
θL + (1− βL)C
θL−1
θL
] θL
θL−1 (2.1)
where βL ∈ (0, 1) captures the relative productivity of manual skills and θL ∈ (0,∞)
measures the elasticity of substitution between M and C.
Manual tasks, such as carrying heavy objects, or using hands/tools on the
workplace, are those requiring physical skills. Communication tasks (for instance
making speeches or presentations, and writing documents) require instead good
language skills. Under the assumption of perfect competition, profit maximisation
yields to the following relative demand function for communication versus manual
tasks:
C
M
=
(
1− βL
βL
)θL ( wC
wM
)−θL
(2.2)
The relative task demand in equation (2.2) is directly related to the worker’s
relative efficiency in performing different tasks and the relative task compensation.
“Domestic” native-born workers (D) and “foreign-born” immigrant workers (F )
differ from each other in terms of relative task productivity. Each less-educated
worker allocate one unit of time to perform µj units of manual tasks, ζj units of com-
munication tasks, or some partition of the two. The assumption that natives have
a comparative advantage in communication tasks implies that (ζD/µD) > (ζF/µF ).
The equilibrium relative supply of communication versus manual tasks for na-
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tives and immigrants is derived from labour income maximisation of a representa-
tive individual who allocate her/his time between the two types of tasks5:
cj
mj
=
(
wC
wM
) δ
1−δ
(
ζj
µj
) 1
1−δ
(2.3)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) captures the decreasing returns from performing a single task. Equa-
tion (2.3) describes the individual relative task supply of communication versus
manual tasks for natives (j=D) and immigrants (j=F )6. The relative supply de-
pends positively on relative task compensation, (wC/wM), and on worker’s relative
efficiency in performing tasks, (ζj/µj). The relative task supply C/M in the whole
economy, obtained by aggregating individual task supply in (2.3), is a weighted
average of the relative supply by natives and immigrants of both tasks:
C
M
=
CF + CD
MF +MD
= ϕ(f)
CF
MF
+ (1− ϕ(f)) CD
MD
(2.4)
The weight ϕ(f) represents the share of manual tasks provided by immigrants,
which is simply a monotonic transformation of the foreign-born share of less-
educated workers f = LF/(LF + LD). This weighting procedure allows to account
for different optimal task provisions between immigrants and natives. The equilib-
rium relative compensation of tasks w∗C/w
∗
M is then easily obtained by substituting
(2.3) for natives and immigrants in (2.4) and then by equating the relative supply
to the relative demand in (2.2):
w∗C
w∗M
=
(
1− βL
βL
) (1−δ)θL
(1−δ)θL+δ
[
ζ
µ
(
f,
ζF
µF
)]
− +
−1
(1−δ)θL+δ
(2.5)
where the function ζ
µ
(
f, ζF
µF
)
is the average relative communication ability. More
precisely, ζ
µ
(
f, ζF
µF
)
=
[
ϕ(f)(ζF/µF )
1
(1−δ) + (1− ϕ(f))(ζD/µD)
1
(1−δ)
](1−δ)
.
The expression for the optimal provision of communication to manual tasks
by natives is derived by substituting the equilibrium wage into the aggregate task
5We skip some derivations for simplicity. A more detailed exposition can be found in the
original paper.
6In the original notation, j represents not only the type of worker (native or immigrant) but
also her/his occupation. Indeed, it is on the basis of their relative effectiveness in performing
different tasks that workers select the occupation.
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supply for natives:
C∗D
M∗D
=
(
1− βL
βL
) δθL
(1−δ)θL+δ
(
ζD
µD
) 1
(1−δ)
[
ζ
µ
(
f,
ζF
µF
)]
− +
−1
(1−δ)θL+δ
δ
1−δ
(2.6)
From equation (2.5) one can see how an increase in the share of immigrants (f)
has a negative effect on the average relative communication ability ζ
µ
(
f, ζF
µF
)
. This,
in turn, implies an increase in the return to communication relative to manual tasks
and, ultimately, a rise in the relative supply of communication tasks by natives.
Hence, the hypothesis that we empirically test is that less-educated natives respond
to immigration inflows of similarly educated workers by increasing their provision
of communication tasks.
2.4 Empirical implementation
By taking the logarithmic derivative of the optimal provision of communication
to manual tasks in equation (2.6), one can derive an empirically implementable
specification:
ln
(
CD
MD
)
rt
= αr + τt + γfrt + εrt (2.7)
where ln (CD/MD)rt is the (log) average ratio of communication versus manual task
supply at the region(r)-year(t) level, our spatial unit of analysis7. Region fixed-
effects αr, which account for region-specific unobserved characteristics of the pop-
ulation, capture the term (1/(1− δ)) x ln(ζD/µD) from (2.6). Time fixed-effects τt ac-
count for common time-varying technological parameters (i.e. nation-wide shocks)
and capture the term (δθL/((1− δ)θL + δ)) x ln((1−βL)/βL) from (2.6). The term (f)rt
represents the share of low-educated foreign-born workers at the region-year cell.
Its coefficient γ ≡ −(1/((1− δ)θL + δ))(δ/(1− δ)) x (∂ln(ζ/µ)/∂f) is our main parameter
of interest. Following the predictions of the theoretical model presented in Section
2.3, we will empirically test the hypothesis that γ > 0, i.e. that less-educated na-
tive workers increase their relative supply of communication versus manual tasks
7In this paper we follow the so-called spatial correlation approach, as opposed to the national
approach (see Section 2.2 for details).
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in response to inflows of similarly skilled immigrants.
The measurement of the effect of immigration on local labour markets requires
some identification assumptions which are widely discussed in the literature. The
first one is that natives should not out-migrate from their region as a consequence
of immigration flows, since this would disperse the effect of immigration across the
national economy and undermine the ability to identify it. The second assumption
in the OLS estimates is that, after controlling for the fixed effects and demographic
characteristics, the variation of the share of less-educated foreign-born is exogenous
and is not driven by unobserved employment opportunities. An additional related
issue is potential measurement error in the share of low-educated foreign born
workers at the regional level which could cause attenuation bias in OLS estimates.
In what follows we discuss all these problems.
2.4.1 Natives’ inter-regional mobility
Whether the out-migration of natives affects the measurement of immigration’s im-
pact on local labour markets outcomes remains still disputed and previous studies
for the US present conflicting results. While Wright et al. (1997), Card and Di-
Nardo (2000) and Card (2001) find little or no evidence of an adverse effect of
immigration on native internal mobility, Frey (1995) and Borjas (2003) consider
out-migration a relevant issue.
As far as Britain is concerned, Hatton and Tani (2005) recently examined the
relationship between immigration and interregional mobility. Their analysis, which
covers the period from 1982 to 2000, shows that there is a negative correlation
between net migration rate from abroad and inter-regional net migration rates.
This relationship is however significant only for the southern regions. Moreover,
their study is based on population and not labour force flows and it does not
investigate the differential impact by education levels. Using Labor Force Survey
data, Gregg et al. (2004) show little evidence of any significant trend in regional
mobility during the period 1979 to 2000. They also find that mobility is more
limited amongst low educated people. Additionally, Wadsworth (2012) find a very
week correlation between UK-born mobility and immigrant inflows at the level of
local areas between 2004 and 2008. We can therefore argue that the assumption
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that labour markets are regional in scope is a reasonable one.
2.4.2 Endogenous allocation of immigrants and measure-
ment error
A more relevant identification issue is the potential endogeneity of the share of
foreign-born workers. There are a number of possible omitted variables that in-
fluence the allocation of immigrants across the regions of the receiving country.
Indeed, it is likely that immigrants are not randomly allocated across local labour
markets and might be attracted to areas with a particular occupation according
to expected employment opportunities. Our concern is that unobserved labour de-
mand conditions at the regional level could have simultaneously affected immigrant
choices and the relative supply of communication tasks by less-educated natives.
Moreover, potential measurement error of the share of low-educated foreign born
workers at the region-year level could lead to attenuation bias in OLS estimates.
In order to address both endogeneity and measurement error, we construct an
instrumental variable for the share of low-educated foreign-born workers. We fol-
low a traditional approach in the literature, based on the Card (2001) shift-share
instrument, which consists of exploiting past immigrant concentrations to remove
the effect of unobserved demand shocks that might affect location choices8. Past
concentrations are indeed an important determinant of immigrants’ location de-
cisions, especially for low educated workers. Because of information networks and
other personal preferences, immigrants are attracted in those areas where groups
with the same cultural and linguistic background are located. Under the assump-
tion that historical settlements are uncorrelated with current economic shocks
within each cell, we can obtain an exogenous measure for the share of immigrants.
Similarly to D’Amuri and Peri (2012) we combine Labour Force Survey data,
the main dataset used in this paper and described in Section 2.5, with two external
sources. From the 1991 national Census9, we calculate the population levels of im-
migrants by region and continent of origin (a) (Asia, Africa, North America, South
8Alternative identification strategies take advantage of natural experiments or government
policies (see Dustmann et al., 2008, for a short review).
9We downloaded Individual SARs (Sample of Anonymized Records) for Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. Further information can be found at: http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/sars.
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America, Europe, and Oceania). We then multiply these initial (1991) values for
the national growth rates of each area of origin immigrant group, constructed from
yearly immigration flows available in the Ortega-Peri database10. These imputed
number of less-educated immigrants for each area of origin are then aggregated at
the region-year level. Our instrument is then obtained dividing the total number
of imputed immigrants by the total population in the cell (total natives plus total
imputed immigrants). More formally we have that:
f imputedrt =
∑6
a=1
(immar,1991) ∗ (1 + ga,1991−t)
nativesr,t +
∑6
a=1
(immar,1991) ∗ (1 + ga,1991−t)
(2.8)
where (1+ga,1991−t) is the overall growth rate of immigrants by area of origin between
1991 and year t. This instrumental variable not only has the advantage of exploiting
the area of origin of immigrants, but it also uses a larger Census sample to address
potential measurement error.
2.5 Data and descriptive statistics
Our main data source is the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the years 1997-
200611. We exclude the years of the Great Recession due to data limitation in the
construction of our instrument. The LFS is a continuous household survey of the
employment circumstances of the UK population. It contains hundreds of variables
which cover many features of the UK labour market and related topics. The LFS
has been running on a biannual basis from 1973 and 1983; it then became annual
in 1984. Data were made available quarterly from Spring 1992, increasing almost
fourfold the sample size. Each LFS’ quarter about 60,000 households are inter-
viewed. We append the four quarterly datasets in a given year into one, retaining
only respondents who were interviewed for the first time at each quarter12.
We restrict our analysis to native and immigrant workers (i.e. employees and
self-employed), aged between 16 and 65. While the LFS does not collect data on
10We thank Francesc Ortega and Giovanni Peri for making the data publicly available at
http://economics.ucdavis.edu/people/gperi/site/papers/copy of ortega peri bilateral migration 2012.zip.
11Neither the New Annual Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) nor the Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings (ASHE) contain information on the place of birth. So we deem that the LFS is the
best available source at present.
12We use the variable thiswv to ensure that each household is only included once each year.
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immigration status, it does include questions on country of birth and nationality.
We define immigrants those individuals who are foreign-born. Because we want
to focus primarily on the impact that less-educated immigrants have on natives’
task-specialisation, we exclude from our analysis highly educated workers. We ex-
ploit information on the age at which respondents left full-time education to define
educational achievements. It is indeed well known that the measure based on the
highest qualification achieved classifies foreign qualifications into the general cate-
gory of “other qualification”, irrespective of the level of the qualification held (see
Manacorda et al., 2012, for more details). Individuals who left-full time education
at age 21 or later are classified as highly educated. Among less educated workers,
we distinguish individuals with a secondary education (left full-time education at
ages 17-20) from those without it (never had full-time education or left it before
17). Individuals still in education are entirely excluded from the sample.
Area studies by Peri and Sparber (2009) and Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica
(2011) interpret as labour markets US states and Spanish provinces respectively.
For the UK, we chose 13 regions as our econometric unit of analysis. The LFS
codes 20 regions13 but we reduce the number to 13 by aggregating some of them
in order to reflect the Census 1991 classification: North, Yorks and Humber, East
Midlands, East Anglia, Inner London, Outer London, Rest of South East, South
West, West Midlands, North West, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Table 2.1 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample. Natives and im-
migrants with little educational attainments are quite similar in terms of human
capital characteristics. The most significant difference is in terms of educational
attainments, with a higher percentage of immigrants having a secondary education
compared to natives, as similarly found by Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2011)
for Spain. As far as the regional distribution is concerned, Figure 2.4 shows that
in 2006 Inner and Outer London were the areas with the highest concentration of
foreign-born workers, followed by the Rest of South East and East Anglia.
13Tyne and Wear, Rest of Northern Region, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Rest of Yorkshire
and Humberside, East Midlands, East Anglia, Inner London, Outer London, Rest of the South
East, South West, West Midlands, Rest of West Midlands, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Rest
of North West, Wales, Central Clydeside, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
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Table 2.1
Descriptive statistics, less-educated workers (1997-2006)
Variables Natives Immigrants
Human capital characteristics
Average age 40.3 40.1
Average years of education 16.4 17.6
Female (%) 46.2 46.0
Younger than 40 (%) 51.1 51.3
Secondary education (%) 30.9 55.2
Primary education (or less) (%) 69.1 44.8
Tot. obs. 350,409 24,655
Average obs. per region-year cell 2,695.45 189.65
Notes: Workers (employees and self-employed) aged 16-65. Secondary educa-
tion: left full-time education between the ages of 17 and 20; primary education
(or less): left full-time education before 16 years old (included) or never had
full- time education. Full-time students are excluded. Source: Labour Force
Survey (LFS).
Figure 2.4
Percentage of low educated immigrants by region, 1997 and 2006
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2.5.1 Task-intensity variables
In order to investigate the effects of immigrants on natives’ task specialisation, we
need information on the activities performed by workers on the job. We derive our
task intensity measures at the occupational level from an additional source, the
UK Skills Surveys. Unlike previous studies on immigration and task-specialisation
in European countries (see Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica, 2011; D’Amuri and
Peri, 2012) we do not rely on the U.S. Department of Labor’s O*Net abilities sur-
vey to derive data on job task requirements. Hence, we do not need to assume that
the task composition of occupations is the same in the two countries.
The aim of the UK Skills Surveys is to provide an analysis of the level and
distribution of skills being used in British workplaces. They are not carried out
continuously each year and data are available only for 1997, 2001 and 2006. At
each wave, information on job characteristics and working conditions are collected,
including details on the tasks performed. The three cross-sections cover altogether
14,717 workers (2,467 in 1997, 4,470 in 2001 and 7,780 in 2006).
We convert occupational codes from the Standard Occupation Classification
(SOC90 and SOC2000) into the International Standard Classification of Occupa-
tions (ISCO-88) using crosswalks made available by the CAMSIS project14. This
classification makes our results easily comparable with previous studies for Euro-
pean countries. We retain only those occupations at the 2-digit level which appear
in all three waves and exclude those for which the data appeared unreliable: army
(ISCO 1), legislators and senior officials (ISCO 11) and agricultural, fishery and
related labourers (ISCO 92). Employment in these occupations occurred only in a
very small number.
At each wave respondents are asked how much a particular activity is important
for his/her job on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (“not at all/does not apply) to 5
(“essential”). These variables in Likert scale are converted into increasing cardinal
scale from 0 (“not at all/does not apply) to 4 (“essential”) and then normalised
in order to range between 0 and 1. Among all the available ability scores, we only
select those relevant for our analysis, which are used to derive measures of the
14Available at: http://www.camsis.stir.ac.uk/occunits/uksoc90toisco88v1.sps and
http://www.camsis.stir.ac.uk/occunits/uksoc00toisco88v1.sps
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“manual” and “communication” skills. We follow the existing literature as close
as possible by selecting abilities from the UK Skills Surveys which resemble to
those available in the O*Net dataset. We retain responses on “Skill or accuracy in
using hands/fingers”(e.g. to assemble or repair), “Physical stamina”(e.g. to work
on physical activities) and “Physical strength”(e.g. to carry, push or pull heavy
objects) for the manual aspect, and on “Making speeches and presentations”and
“Writing long documents with correct spelling and grammar”for the communi-
cation (oral and written) dimension15. Task measures are then collapsed at the
ISCO-88 2-digit level for the pooled dataset, weighting each observation for the
individual sampling weight. The final dataset is then merged with LFS data by
occupation16. Finally, the manual and communication indicators are both derived
as an average of the selected elements above mentioned. Table 2.2 reports their val-
ues, together with their ratio, in each occupation. As one would expect, the values
of C/M are lowest among craft and trade workers, and in operative and elementary
occupations. Managers and professionals score instead among the highest.
2.6 The effects of immigrants on natives’ relative
task performance
In this section we test whether less-skilled natives increase their relative supply
of communication tasks as a response to immigration by estimating equation 2.7.
However, we must first take into account the fact that there are personal charac-
teristics which affect task supply at the individual (and regional) level and may be
also correlated with immigration stock. Peri and Sparber (2009) avoid this poten-
tial spurious correlation by constructing manual and communication task supply
which are “cleaned” of demographic effects. We apply their methodology by re-
gressing natives’ task supply at the individual level on gender (a female indicator),
age, and education (a secondary education dummy)17. Next, we use the “cleaned”
15Using O*Net data, (Peri and Sparber, 2009) consider the following skill sub-types: “Limb,
hand, and finger dexterity”, “Body coordination and flexibility” and “Strength” for the manual
category, and “Oral” and “Written” skills for the communication index.
16SOC90 and SOC2000 codes in the LFS were also mapped into the ISCO-88 classification.
17Results would be qualitatively the same if we controlled for demographic characteristics at
the region-year cell level in the final regression (see Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica, 2011).
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Table 2.2
Task intensities by occupation
Occupations (ISCO-88 code) M C C/M
12. Corporate managers 0.29 0.59 2.05
13. General managers 0.54 0.39 0.72
21. Physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals 0.27 0.54 2.00
22. Life science and health professionals 0.45 0.56 1.23
23. Teaching professionals 0.38 0.75 1.96
24. Other professionals 0.23 0.62 2.73
31. Physical and engineering science associate professionals 0.39 0.42 1.08
32. Life science and health associate professionals 0.62 0.50 0.81
33. Teaching associate professionals 0.34 0.60 1.79
34. Other associate professionals 0.30 0.54 1.84
41. Office clerks 0.28 0.36 1.26
42. Customer services clerks 0.31 0.29 0.92
51. Personal and protective services workers 0.56 0.33 0.59
52. Salespersons, models and demonstrators 0.53 0.21 0.40
61. Market-oriented skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.81 0.25 0.31
71. Extraction and building trades workers 0.81 0.23 0.29
72. Metal, machinery etc trades workers 0.73 0.28 0.39
73. Precision, handicraft, printing etc trades workers 0.68 0.22 0.32
74. Other craft etc trades workers 0.71 0.20 0.28
81. Stationary-plant etc operators 0.70 0.21 0.30
82. Machine operators and assemblers 0.66 0.24 0.36
83. Drivers and mobile-plant operators 0.59 0.18 0.30
91. Sales and services elementary occupations 0.55 0.20 0.36
93. Labourers in mining, construction 0.70 0.21 0.30
manufacturing and transport
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on UK Skills Surveys 1997, 2001 and 2006, and LFS 1997-2009.
Only working individuals between 16 and 65 with little educational attainment (secondary and pri-
mary or less education) are considered. The manual (M) and communication (C) indexes are derived
averaging task measures which capture respectively the intensity of physical activities and language
(oral and written) skills.
44 Chapter 2. The Effects of Immigration on Natives’ Task-Specialisation
Table 2.3
Task supplies “cleaned” of demographic effects
Variable M C
Female -0.095*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.000)
Age -0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Primary educ. 0.097*** -0.093***
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.509*** 0.359***
(0.001) (0.001)
N 350,409 350,409
Notes: We use the “cleaned” residuals from the above regressions
to compute the manual and communication task supply measures
used in the empirical specification. Source: Labour Force Survey
(LFS) and UK Skills Surveys.
residuals to compute the manual and communication task supply measures used
in equation 2.7. Table 2.3 reports results from these first-stage cleaning procedure.
As it would be expected, the coefficient for the female indicator and age are neg-
ative for manual tasks and positive for communication tasks. Conversely, there is
a positive effect of primary education (with respect to the base category, that is
secondary education) on the supply of manual tasks.
We first estimate equation 2.7 by ordinary least squares (OLS), clustering stan-
dard errors by region. Column 1 of Table 2.4 presents the estimate of γ, which
provides a direct test of the Peri and Sparber (2009) theoretical model. We find
that an increase in the share of foreign-born workers has a positive and significant
impact on natives’ relative supply of communication and manual tasks. Results
suggest that a one percentage-point increase in the foreign-born share of less-
educated workers increases the relative supply of communication versus manual
tasks among natives by 0.55 percent.
We also test whether this positive effect is mostly related to an increase in the
supply of communication skills (oral and written) or a decrease in natives supply
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Table 2.4
The impact of foreign-born workers on less-educated natives’ relative
task performance, OLS and WLS.
Explanatory variable: share of low-educated foreign-born workers
Dependent OLS WLS OLS WLS
variables w/o London w/o London
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(CD/MD) 0.55*** 0.47** 0.60*** 0.49
(0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.33)
ln(CD) 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.34*
(0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.17)
ln(MD) -0.15* -0.08 -0.23** -0.14
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.15)
Region and year X X X X
fixed effects
Observations 130 130 110 110
Notes: Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.
Specifications (3) and (4) do not include Inner and Outer London. Significance levels * p< 0.1, **
p< 0.05, *** p< 0.001.
of physical tasks. This is done by separately estimating equations 2.9 and 2.10:
ln(CD)rt = αr + τt + γcfrt + εrt (2.9)
ln(MD)rt = αr + τt + γmfrt + εrt (2.10)
The estimates of γc and γm in column 1 of Table 2.4 suggest that one percentage-
point increase in the foreign-born share is associated with a significant 0.35 rise
in natives’ supply of communication tasks, but only a small decline of 0.15 in
the manual task supply. As column 2 shows, taking into account variation in the
employed population across regions by using weighted least squares (WLS) does
not significantly alter our findings. The magnitude of our coefficients is consistent
with the findings for the US. The estimates of γ, γc and γm reported in Peri and
Sparber (2009) are respectively 0.34, 0.31 an -0.03.
We also run the same regressions excluding Inner and Outer London where
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Table 2.5
The impact of foreign-born workers on less-educated natives’ relative
task performance, OLS and IV.
Explanatory variable: share of low-educated foreign-born workers
Dependent variables OLS IV
(1) (2)
ln(CD/MD) 0.55*** 0.79***
(0.11) (0.13)
ln(CD) 0.35*** 0.56***
(0.05) (0.08)
ln(MD) -0.15* -0.07
(0.08) (0.13)
Region and year fixed effects X X
First stage F-test (p-value) . 35.2
(0.00)
Observations 130 130
Notes: Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are re-
ported in parentheses. The first stage F-test refers to the specification where
ln(CD/MD) is used as a dependent variable. Significance levels * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05,
*** p< 0.001.
immigrants concentrations are substantially higher than the average. Columns 3
and 4 of Table 2.4 report OLS and WLS results. As one would note, our results
are not driven by the exclusion of these outliers in the data. The OLS estimate of
γ increases only to 0.60 from 0.55.
Table 2.5 reports instead results from IV estimates. As column 2 shows, the
estimated IV impact is higher that OLS effects, suggesting a downward bias in the
first specification. Indeed, the estimate of γ increases to 0.79, γc to 0.55 and γm
to -0.07. Results obtained instrumenting the share of foreign-born workers suggest
that the impact of immigration on natives’ task-specialisation is plausibly causal.
2SLS estimates of γ in Peri and Sparber (2009) range from 0.37 to 0.51, making our
coefficient from 1.5 to 2 times larger than the one estimated in the US. The first
stage F-test shows that our instrument is highly correlated with the endogenous
regressor frt. Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2011) also find a similar effect
for all natives, although estimates diverge when men and women are separately
considered (a point we return to in Section 2.7).
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Table 2.6
Average relative task supply across group of less-educated workers.
Variable Natives All Long-term Recent
immigrants immigrants immigrants
C/M 0.943 0.918 0.943 0.809
(0.680) (0.672) (0.628) (0.679)
N 350,409 24,655 20,066 4,166
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on UK Skills Surveys 1997, 2001 and 2006, and
LFS 1997-2009. Only working individuals between 16 and 65 with little educational
attainment (secondary and primary or less education) are considered. Recent immi-
grants are those with at most 5 years of residence in the UK. Standard deviations
in parenthesis.
2.6.1 Recent and long-term immigrants
In the model by Peri and Sparber (2009), immigrants have a comparative advan-
tage in performing manual, as oppose to communication, tasks because of language
and cultural barriers. Among all foreign-born workers, we would therefore expect
recent immigrants (defined as those with at most five years of residence in the
UK) to have an even greater comparative advantage with respect to long-term
immigrants. We would like to test in two separate regressions whether the effects
of the share of recent immigrants on natives’ specialisation are greater than those
induced by long-term immigrants. However, similarly to Amuedo-Dorantes and
de la Rica (2011), we find that the correlation between the share of recent and
long-term immigrants is very high (i.e. 0.9). Therefore, high collinearity does not
allow us to directly compare the effect of recent as opposed to long-term immi-
grants. Still, we can assess whether language and cultural barriers play a crucial
role in our framework by testing if there are statistically significant differences in
the ratio of communication to manual tasks across these two groups.
Table 2.6 displays the average relative supply of communication tasks for recent
and long-term immigrants, and for natives and all immigrants as well. Natives and
long-term immigrants score higher than all immigrants and recent-immigrants. We
performed two-sample t test for every pair of groups. The corresponding two-tailed
p-values are always lower than 0.01. We therefore conclude that the difference of
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means in the ratio of communication and manual tasks between natives and all
immigrants, and recent and long-term immigrants is significantly different from
0. These results confirm the intuition that language and cultural barriers are an
important driver of task-specialisation, as found by Amuedo-Dorantes and de la
Rica (2011) for Spain.
2.7 Extensions and Sensitivity analysis
2.7.1 Findings across demographic groups
We now take a closer look at the effects of an increase in foreign-born share on na-
tives’ relative task supplies by separately focusing on different demographic groups.
We replicate our analysis by gender, age and educational attainment to assess
whether there are significant differences in natives’ response to immigration. Table
2.7 displays the estimates from separate regressions for each specific group, using
OLS, WLS and IV as methods of estimation.
IV estimates suggest that men respond to a percentage point increase in the
foreign-born share by increasing their relative supply of communication vs manual
tasks by 1.13 percent. Conversely, the effect on women’s task specialisation is sub-
stantially lower and not statistically significant. The impact of foreign-born workers
on natives’ relative task performance varies also by age, being higher among young
workers (i.e. those aged less than 40, the sample average) relatively to old workers
(the estimated γ being 1.03 and 0.45 respectively). Finally, differences arise also
when natives are grouped by educational level. Indeed, workers with primary edu-
cation (or less) shift their relative task supply more than workers with secondary
education, but differences between coefficients are smaller. In line with Peri and
Sparber (2009), these findings confirm the intuition that the impact of immigration
is slightly higher among young natives because of greater occupational mobility,
and among very low educated natives because they are more vulnerable to job
competition.
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Table 2.7
The impact of foreign-born workers on less-educated natives’ relative
task performance for specific demographic groups.
Explanatory variable: share of low-educated foreign-born workers
Dependent variables OLS WLS IV
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Cmen/Mmen) 0.75*** 0.61** 1.13***
(0.15) (0.25) (0.12)
ln(Cwomen/Mwomen) 0.24* 0.22 0.18
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
ln(Cyoung/Myoung) 0.60*** 0.46** 1.03***
(0.13) (0.20) (0.17)
ln(Cold/Mold) 0.49*** 0.44* 0.45***
(0.13) (0.22) (0.17)
ln(Cprimary/Mprimary) 0.74*** 0.58** 0.96***
(0.18) (0.26) (0.13)
ln(Csecondary/Msecondary) 0.40* 0.51** 0.89***
(0.20) (0.17) (0.19)
Notes: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions and ln(C/M) is calculated for each
specific demographic group of natives. The total number of observations for each regression is 130 (10
years x 13 regions). We define individuals with primary education (or less) those who left full-time
education before 16 years old (included) or never had full-time education. Region and year dummies
are included but not reported. Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity
are reported in parentheses. Significance levels * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.001.
2.7.2 O*Net task variables
Thus far we have shown that in the UK natives respond to increasing immigra-
tion by shifting their task supply and providing more communication relative to
manual tasks. We rely on the UK Skills Surveys to measure the task content of
occupations, instead of exploiting the more common O*Net dataset used in the
literature. However, as we are aware that a perfect correspondence between task
variables in the two datasets does not exist and that we only selected the measures
of interest which resemble each other the most, we perform the same analysis using
the O*Net data with the aim of comparing results.
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Table 2.8
The impact of foreign-born workers on less-educated natives’
specialisation, using O*Net task intensities.
Explanatory variable: share of low-educated foreign-born workers
Dependent variables OLS WLS IV
(1) (2) (3)
ln(CD/MD) 0.48** 0.38 0.46**
(0.16) (0.22) (0.15)
ln(CD) 0.30* 0.24 0.26**
(0.11) (0.13) (0.09)
ln(MD) -0.12* -0.08 -0.05
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Region and year fixed effects X X X
First stage F-test (p-value) . . 35.2
(0.00)
Observations 130 130 130
Notes: Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are re-
ported in parentheses. Task intensities at the occupational level are derived from the
O*Net dataset. The first stage F-test refers to the specification where ln(CD/MD)
is used as a dependent variable.
Table 2.8 reports the estimates obtained by deriving the manual and com-
munication indexes from exactly the same ability scores used in Peri and Sparber
(2009), after a suitable conversion of occupational codes18. We note that all coef-
ficients have the expected sign, confirming the findings presented in the previous
section. OLS estimates of γ, γc and γm are almost identical to those obtained mea-
suring the task content of occupations from the UK Skills Surveys. Some differences
arise when instrumenting the share of foreign born workers. However, although the
magnitude is 1.7 times lower, γ is still positive and statistically significant. These
findings suggest that the arbitrary choice of variables to measure the task content
of occupations, driven by the absence of a perfect matching between UK Skills
18US SOC1990 occupational codes in O*Net were matched to the ISCO-88 classification using
the crosswalk available at: http://www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/CAMSIS/occunits/us90toisco88v2.sps. We
thank Giovanni Peri and Chad Sparber for making the data available.
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Surveys and O*Net questionnaires, does not substantially alter our conclusions.
2.8 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we assess the impact of immigration on local labour markets in the
UK from a task-based perspective. We empirically test the predictions of Peri and
Sparber (2009) model of comparative advantage in tasks performance to evaluate
whether less-skilled natives responded to increasing immigration inflows of simi-
larly educated workers by shifting their provision of task supplies. Using Labour
Force Survey (LFS) and UK Skills Survey data from 1997 through 2006, we find
that an increase in the foreign-born share has a significant positive effect on natives’
relative communication task supply. In order to cope with potential endogeneity
of the share of immigrants, we construct a suitable instrumental variable based
on past immigration concentrations. IV estimates suggest that natives increased
their relative task supply by 0.79 percent for every percentage point increase in
the foreign-born share. We also show that this effect vary across demographic
groups, being higher among men, young people and workers with primary educa-
tion (or less) relatively to women, old people and workers with secondary education
respectively. We conclude that also in the UK, similarly to the US and Spain, less-
educated native workers responded to immigration inflows of similarly educated
workers by increasing their relative supply of communication tasks.
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Chapter 3
Spousal Wage Gap and
Assortative Mating∗
3.1 Introduction
Post-war Britain, and other developed countries, saw the high point of the male
breadwinner model. Strong gender division of labour, with the male earning in the
labour market and women engaged in child bearing and home production, meant
that most men worked but few women did. Theoretical models have demonstrated
that, even in absence of gender based pay discrimination, expectations of lower
engagement in the labour market can create gender pay gaps as firms and individ-
uals invest in the careers of men and women differentially and within couples the
spouses invest more in maximising the wage of the primary earner (Franc¸ois and
Van Ours, 2000). So as Winkler (1998) suggests, given that the primary earner
is more likely to have the chance to improve his or her career and to raise his or
her wage, the distribution of earnings within couples will ultimately affect the size
and the evolution of the overall gender wage gap. In the face of even minor initial
pay differences across genders or just occupational segregation with women being
in lower paid positions, a self-reinforcing cycle of lower participation among the
∗This chapter is the result of a research conducted with Prof. Paul Gregg (Centre for Market
and Public Organisation, University of Bristol) and Prof. Paul Clarke (Institute for Social and
Economic Research, University of Essex). I thank the Centre for Market and Public Organisation
(CMPO) for hosting me.
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lower earning spouse (the woman in the male breadwinner model) and investment
within a couple on the career of the spouse with the higher potential wage will
emerge.
Over the last 40 years or so the labour market has seen a gender revolution in
women’s participation and wages. Some 9% fewer working age women than men
work now (67% women to 76% men) compared to a 40% gap in the 1970s. Likewise
the gender pay gap has steadily fallen. Between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s,
the ratio of full-time female average earnings to average male earnings rose from
59 to 77% (Harkness, 1996) and now stands at 85% (Office for National Statistics,
2013) and the median full-time pay gap is now under 10% (Office for National
Statistics, 2013). Although including part-time workers which are generally lower
paid and more often women the pay gap remains around 20%. In this paper we
explore the implications of these huge changes for the evolution of the spousal wage
gap, alternatively called spousal pay gap or gender pay gap within couples, and its
relationship with the overall pay gap, changes in labour force participation and the
level of assortative mating between partners. Gender wage differentials have been
extensively studied by labour economists and the literature is very broad and well-
established. Yet, empirical research has traditionally focused on overall differences
between men’s and women’s wages and there are few studies on earning disparities
within couples. The specific interest on spousal wage gap can show how the shift
towards greater gender equality plays out within families. But also because of the
potential to change investment decisions within couples and by employers which
affect in the long-run future earnings growth and labour market outcomes and for
future economic modeling of gender wage differentials based on the household.
The paper starts with a statistical model which shows how the probability of
a positive spousal wage gap (male wage greater than partners) depends on the
average gender wage gap, the variance of the male and female wage distributions
and on the level of sorting or assortative mating, based on wages, there is among
couples. The model shows how men can still earn more than their partners even
with a low overall pay gap when assortative mating is high or the variance in
earnings is low. We show how the model fits the data well and use it to explore
what lies behind the observed decline in men earning more than their partners in
terms of hourly wages. Among dual earner couples 79% of men earn more than
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their partners in 1991 and this falls to just above 70% by 2008. This is being
driven by falls in the within couple gender pay gap from nearly 45% to 30% over
the period. We then turn to changing participation patterns of men and women
and how this affects our story. We employ the estimation method developed by
Wooldridge (1995) to correct for sample selection in panel data models where we
can observe wages in other periods for individuals. We show that women who are
excluded from labour market participation are increasingly those with the lowest
potential wage.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II presents an
overview of the relevant literature. Section III provides a statistical framework
to assess the impact of matching between partners on the probability that men
earn more than women. Section IV provides a counterfactual exercise. Section V
presents the data used in the empirical analysis. Section VI reviews recent changes
in the spousal wage gap and couples’ earnings arrangements in the UK. Section
VII then goes on to assess quantitatively how well the statistical framework match
empirical developments. Finally, in Section VII we correct for sample selection in
a panel data context and we analyze the evolution of the spousal wage gap using
potential wages for non-working spouses when we observe a wage for their partner.
Section IX concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
As in many other industrialised countries, in the United Kingdom the overall gen-
der pay gap has significantly fallen over the last 30 years (Anderson et al., 2001;
Joshi and Paci, 1996, 1998; Manning and Robinson, 2004). Between the mid-1970s
and the early 1990s, the ratio of full-time female average earnings to average male
earnings rose from 59 to 77% (Harkness, 1996) and now stands at 85% (Office for
National Statistics, 2013) and the median full-time pay gap is now under 10% (Of-
fice for National Statistics, 2013). Although including part-time workers which are
generally lower paid and more often women the pay gap remains around 20%. Rel-
ative to other European countries, the United Kingdom ranks very high in terms of
gender wage differentials (Beblo et al., 2003; Blau and Kahn, 1996). While there are
many papers concerning the evolution of the overall gender pay gap over time, the
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analysis of income disparities within families and couples in Britain is extremely
scarce. Nicodemo (2009) investigates the recent evolution of the gender gap within
married couples in European countries. However, given that the study is focused
on Mediterranean countries, the empirical evidence for the United Kingdom that
is presented is very limited.
In recent years there has been growing sociological research on couples’ earn-
ings patterns in the United States. Several studies (e.g. Raley et al., 2006; Winkler,
1998; Winslow-Bowe, 2009a) document the decline in pure gender-based special-
isation among American couples, the increase in the proportion of co-providing
dual-earner couples and the rise of “non-traditional”couples (i.e. those in which
the woman is the primary earner). Other papers explore the effect of changes in
gender differentials within households on the division of labour at home and on
marital disruption (e.g. Bittman et al., 2003; Brines, 1994, Heckert et al., 1998;
Sayer and Bianchi, 2000 as cited in Winslow-Bowe 2009b). As far as assortative
mating1 patterns are concerned, during the recent decades educational homogamy
has increased in the United States (Kalmijn, 1991; Mare, 1991; Schwartz and
Mare, 2005) and in many European countries (Blossfeld and Timm, 2003). Trends
in assortative mating were mainly determined by increasing positive mate selec-
tion rather than increasing similarity in men and women’s educational attainments
which changed marital opportunities (Hou and Myles, 2008). Spouses’ similarity
has also been measured in terms of income. Burtless (1999), Sweeney and Cancian
(2004) and Schwartz (2010) show growing correlation between husband’s and wife’s
earnings in the United States from the 1970s onwards. Bredemeier and Juessen
(2013) find a very similar pattern of the correlation coefficient between spousal
wage decile positions, showing however that the increase was particularly marked
between the 1980s and the 1990s while the last decade was characterised by a much
slower trend. Esping-Andersen (2007) estimates the couple correlation of earnings
for some European countries, among which the United Kingdom, in two points
in time (1993 and 2001), he however includes those with zero earnings. In recent
years, the relationship between assortative mating and labour market outcomes has
1The term was coined by Becker (1973) who suggested that ’likes’ marry ’likes’, referring to a
positive relationship between partners’ characteristics. Partners do not randomly pair, but they
rather tend to match in terms of assortative traits, such as education or income.
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been increasingly investigated. Bredemeier and Juessen (2013) show that trends
in assortative mating affect the patterns of wives’ hours worked. Other studies
analyse the impact of assortative mating on inequality throughout the earnings
distribution (Burtless, 1999; Ferna´ndez et al., 2005; Hyslop, 2001; Kremer, 1996;
Schwartz, 2010; Worner, 2006).
3.3 Statistical Framework
We start by presenting a very simple statistical framework to understand the
impact of assortative mating, defined in terms of partners’ wage correlation, on
the spousal pay gap.
Let X1 be a random variable for male wage, and X0 for female wage, and assume
that both wage distributions are normally distributed:
Xg ∼ N(µg, σ2g),
where (g = 1) for men and (g = 0) for women. In this case the spousal wage gap
(WG) is simply the difference of the expected values:
WG = E[X1]− E[X0] = µ1 − µ0 > 0,
which we take to be positive.
If we relax the random pairing of men and women in couples with respect to
wage, so that there is some positive assortative mating, the couple-wise income
distribution is therefore:X1
X0
 ∼ N
µ1
µ0
 ,
σ21 ρσ1σ0
σ20
 ,
where ρ = σ10/σ1σ0 is the correlation coefficient and σ10 is the covariance between
X1 and X0. Random mating and perfect sorting correspond to the extreme cases
where ρ = 0 and ρ = 1, respectively.
The probability that a randomly sampled man’s wage exceeds that of his female
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partner is:
q ≡ Pr(X1 > X0).
Because we are assuming that both distributions are normal and X1 > X0 is equiv-
alent to X1 −X0 > 0,
X1 −X0 ∼ N(WG,σ21 + σ20 − 2ρσ1σ0),
recalling that WG is the positive wage gap. It follows that:
q = 1− Φ
(
−WG√
ν
)
= Φ(WG/
√
ν) (3.1)
where Φ(WG/
√
ν) is the complement of the standard normal cumulative density
function (CDF), and ν = σ21 + σ
2
0 − 2ρσ1σ0. The probability that the gender pay
gap within a couple is positive not only depends on the expected value and the
standard deviations of the two distributions but also on their correlation.
If the variance of the two wage distributions is equal, so that σ1 = σ0 = σ, then
ν = 2σ2(1− ρ) and one can see that:
Φ
(
WG√
2σ2
)
< Φ
(
WG√
2σ2(1− ρ)
)
< 1,
if WG > 0 and there is a positive correlation. In other words, for two populations
with the same average gap and the same standard deviations, non-random mixing
increases the probability of the man’s wage exceeding his partner’s. The lower
bound is the probability under random mixing, and the upper bound is relevant
because Φ(WG/
√
2σ2) → 1 as ρ→ 1, that is, if there is a perfect correlation then it
is certain that the man’s wage is higher.
More realistically, we can assume that both income distributions follow a log-
normal distribution, that is,
Xg ∼ logN(µg, σ2g),
for men (g = 1) and for women (g = 0), where the parameters are those for the
normally distributed (natural) logarithm of Xg: the mean and the variance of
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log(Xg) ≡ Yg (assuming there are no zero wages) for g = 0, 12.
The spousal pay gap is just:
WG = E[X1]− E[X0] = exp(µ1 + σ1/2)− exp(µ0 + σ0/2),
which depends on the means and standard deviations of the two log-wage distribu-
tions. To calculate the man’s-income-exceeds-the-woman’s probability, we might
consider working with X1−X0 which can be closely approximated by a log-normal
distribution (Lo, 2012), but all subsequent calculations would involve inequalities
about zero and so cannot be solved.
Instead, we note that:
Pr(X1 > X0) = Pr(X1/X0 > 1) = Pr[log(X1/X0) > 0] = Pr(Y1 > Y0),
provided that X1, X0 > 0. Using the final equality, we show that the man’s-wage-
exceeds-the-woman’s probability is:
q = Φ
(
− µˆ1 − µˆ0√
ν
)
= Φ
(
ŴG√
ν
)
, (3.2)
which is identical to (3.1) except for the means, standard deviations and correla-
tions being based on (normally distributed) log-wage Yg rather than wage Xg.
3.4 Counterfactual Analysis
Equation (3.2) can be manipulated to answer counterfactual questions. For in-
stance, suppose that the gender pay gap in the population under study is ŴG and
the estimated man’s-wage-exceeds-the-woman’s probability is qˆ then, if the spread
of the two wage distributions is fixed but the pay gap is reduced to WG = ŴG− δ
2The relationship between the normal and the lognormal distributions is indeed:
Xg ∼ logN(µg, σ2g), logXg ∼ N(µg, σ2g).
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Figure 3.1
Probability of a positive spousal wage gap (q) at different levels of
assortative mating (ρ) and mean gap (WG), holding constant the
standard deviations of wage distributions (σ0 and σ1)
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(for some decrement δ > 0), the within-couple correlation required to preserve qˆ:
ρ(δ) =
1
2σˆ0σˆ1
{
σˆ21 + σˆ
2
0 − (σˆ21 + σˆ20 − 2ρˆσˆ1σˆ0)
(
ŴG− δ
ŴG
)2}
, (3.3)
where σˆ0 and σˆ1 are estimates of wage distributions’ standard deviations, and ρˆ is
the observed correlation3.
Figure 3.1 presents a counterfactual exercise that explores the impact of an
increasing assortative mating on the probability that the pay gap (male wage
greater than that of female partner) is positive at different levels of the mean
gap, holding constant only the standard deviations of the male and female wage
distributions. It shows the results from simulating a drop in the mean pay gap from
0.45, the starting value in the data we analyze later, to 0. Different levels of positive
sorting within couples give rise to non-linearities in the probability that the pay
3Equation 3.3 is derived equating Φ
(
ŴG√
ν
)
to
(
ŴG−δ√
νδ
)
, where
√
νδ = σˆ
2
1 + σˆ
2
0 − 2ρ(δ)σˆ1σˆ0.
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Figure 3.2
Probability of a positive spousal wage gap (q) at different levels of the
correlation coefficient (ρ) and standard deviations of the wage
distributions (σ0 and σ1), holding constant the mean gap (WG)
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gap is positive: the lower the positive mean pay gap, the less the relationship is
linear until the case of a zero mean pay gap which implies equal probabilities that
either men’s or women’s wage is the highest within couples, no matter the value
of the correlation coefficient.
Figure 3.2 shows simulation results which shifts the standard deviation of the
two distributions, as well as levels of assortative mating, given the observed level
of average pay gap at the beginning of our data period. This is done to assess
the effect of either a decrease or an increase of wage inequality in both male and
female wage distributions on the probability of a positive pay gap. In one case the
standard deviations of men’s and women’s wage distribution were halved, while
in the second one they were both doubled. For a given observed value of the
average pay gap and correlation coefficient, an increase in wage inequality implies
a decrease in the probability that the male wage is greater than a partners. This
also has implications for measurement error in the data as it shows how such errors
will lead to underestimation of the primacy of the male wage within couples. A
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point we return to below. The simulations results thus show that the male wage can
be higher within couples even with very small gender pay gaps when assortative
mating is high and increasing inequality in wages will result in more women earning
more than their partner if the overall pay gap and levels of assortative mating
remain the same.
3.5 Data and Imputation Strategy
The data set used in our empirical analysis come from the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), a survey of private households in Britain which was carried out
annually from 1991 to 2008, when it was rolled into the larger Understanding Soci-
ety panel. The new data saw some changes to earnings reporting and hence we stop
our analysis in 2008. The survey initially consisted of around 5,500 households and
10,000 individual interviews drawn from 250 different areas of Great Britain, and
then all residents of these households were traced and re-interviewed in successive
waves and new partners of initial sample members joined the survey. In each wave
there are flows in and out of the survey, therefore the panel is highly unbalanced.
We consider all 18 available waves that cover the period 1991-2008. The sample
is then constrained to men and women aged between 20 and 60, as the state
pension for women was 60 over this period and very few people are co-residing as
couple before the age of 20. We exclude couples containing individuals who are
self-employed and those still in full-time education. Real hourly wages are derived
as nominal monthly gross earnings divided by the number of hours worked per
month and deflated by the 2005 Consumer Price Index. The wage distribution is
trimmed such that those earning less than £1 and more than £200 per hour are
excluded from the sample. It is well known that derived hourly wage measures in
household surveys are subject to severe measurement error which would clearly
cause bias in the estimates, as discussed in the previous section (see Dickens and
Manning, 2004). However, as compared to, say, the LFS, the BHPS has a much
longer panel dimension that we can exploit to reduce the downward bias. Our
approach to reduce measurement error in wages is to compute, whenever possible,
a three-period window moving average for individuals.
In order to analyze the gender pay gap within couples we only keep people
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declaring to be married or living as a couple, whose spouse/partner is also inter-
viewed. When the same individual change partner over time, we follow the couple
observation with the longest panel dimension. Couples where none of the part-
ners ever worked are excluded from the sample (582 observations). Observations
where members of a couple are observed in work but do not report a wage are also
dropped4.
The final sample consists of 46,556 individuals or 23,278 couple observations
based on 3,207 distinct couples. Couples are classified as: 1) “dual-earners”, where
both partners are in paid employment and they report a wage in the relevant year
(16,650 observations); 2) “man sole earner”, where we observe a positive wage
for the man and non participation in the labour market for the woman (4,243
observations); 3) “woman sole earner”, where the woman is working and she reports
a wage while the male partner is not (1,238 observations); 4) “no earner”, where
no one in the couple is working in a particular year (1,147 observations), who are
excluded from the analysis of earnings gap.
3.5.1 Wooldridge’s Estimator
When estimating the spousal pay gap and the level of assortative mating, we face
the problem that wages can only be measured when individuals participate in the
labour market. In this section, we describe the method used to predict poten-
tial wages for non-working men and women. Given that participation decision is
likely to be non-random, we need to correct for sample selection. Heckman (1979)
developed an estimator to deal with this source of bias for cross-sectional data.
For panel data, the fixed effects estimator solves the problem when the selection
process is either randomly determined or time constant, which is implausible. Sev-
eral methods which allow for additive individual specific effects both in the binary
selection equation and the wage equation have been suggested to deal with the
problem (see e.g. Kyriazidou, 1997; Rochina-Barrachina, 1999; Vella and Verbeek,
1999; Wooldridge, 1995).
Here we apply the estimation method developed by Wooldridge (1995), which
4Differences in the means of key explanatory variables - such as age and education - among
labour market participants which are due to this restriction are very small and negligible.
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relies on level equations to correct for sample selectivity. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there are few empirical applications which estimate wage equations correcting
for selection into the work force in a panel data context (see e.g. D’Addio et al.,
2002; Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina, 2007; Ja¨ckle and Himmler, 2010; Se-
mykina and Woodridge, 2008).
Let us consider the following model:
wit = xitβ1 + αi + εit; t = 1, ..., T (3.4)
s∗it = zitγ1 + ki + uit; sit = 1[s
∗
it > 0], (3.5)
where 1[.] is an indicator function that equals one if the argument is true (i.e. if
the individual participates in the labour market) and zero otherwise. Wages wit
are observable only if sit=1. The vector of exogenous explanatory variables xit is
a subset of zit which contains in addition some elements that drive selection but
are not included in the wage equation5. Although the model is identified even if
zit=xit, a more convincing identification scheme is to have exclusion restrictions.
Both ki and αi are individual-specific unobserved effects, while uit and εit are
unobserved disturbances. Following Mundlak (1978) and Wooldridge (1995), we
assume that ki can be written as a linear projection onto the time averages of zit,
denoted by z¯i, and an orthogonal residual:
ki = z¯i + ait, (3.6)
Equation (3.5) can be therefore written as:
s∗it = zitγ1 + z¯i + vit, (3.7)
where the composite error term vit=uit + ait is independent of zit and normally
distributed with zero mean and σ2 variance.
Concerning the wage equation, Wooldridge (1995) assumes that the unobserved
5Semykina and Woodridge (2008, 2010) show the procedure to correct for sample selection
with panel data in the presence of endogenous explanatory variables in the primary equation.
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effect αi is a linear projection onto x¯i and bit. Moreover, εit is assumed to be mean
independent of zit conditional on vit and its conditional mean is linear in vit. Under
these assumptions, we can write equation (3.4) as:
wit = x¯iψ1 + xitψ2 + λitξt + eit; t = 1, ..., T (3.8)
where eit is an orthogonal residual, and λit=λ(z¯iγ1) is the Inverse Mills Ratio.
Wooldridge (1995) suggests a procedure to correct for selection bias. This is
done by first running a probit of s∗it on zi and z¯i for each t and saving λˆit, the Inverse
Mills Ratio (IMR). Next, for the selected sample, equation (3.8) is consistently
estimated by pooled OLS. Note that we assume different coefficients for λit in each
time period which Wooldridge (1995) suggests to implement by adding interaction
terms of the IMR and time dummies. Standard errors corrected for first stage
probit estimates and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation should be
computed. This can be done with panel bootstrap, using the cross section units
for the resampling (Wooldridge, 2010).
3.5.2 Empirical Model and Estimation Results
We write our logwage equation as follow:
log(wit) = β0 + ageitβ1 + age
2
itβ2 + educitβ3 +
17∑
t=1
τt + αi + εit (3.9)
We let wages for each individual i at each time period t depend on age and
its square, years of education and time dummies. Next, we write the participation
equation as:
s∗it = γ0 + xitγ1 + nchitγ2 + healthitγ3 + pworkitγ4
+nonlabincomeitγ5 + ki + uit,
(3.10)
where xit is the 1xK vector of all exogenous variables included in wage equation
(3.9). In equation (3.10), sit = 1[s∗it > 0]. We recall that participation in the labour
market is defined as being in paid employment the week before the interview.
We allow the participation decision to depend, in addition to years of education,
age and its square, also on: the number of children, a dummy variable for the
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presence of health problems, an indicator variable for the partner’s labour market
participation, and household non labour income (net of the benefit component, i.e.
pension, transfer and investment income only). All regressors in the participation
equations are assumed to be exogenous. Table B.1 provides a detailed description
of all the variables.
We use both participants and nonparticipants with valid information on the
explanatory variables to estimate the participation equation (3.10) separately for
men and women. For the estimation of the wage equation and for the purpose of
carrying out a preliminary test for selection bias, we only use all individuals that
work in at least two waves.
In the spirit of Wooldridge (1995), we carry out a preliminary test for the
presence of selection bias. This is done using “a variable addition” test which
consists in including in the wage equation the estimates of the IMR obtained from
the sample selection probit at each time period, λit, as well as their interactions
with time dummies. We then perform a Wald test on the joint significance of the
selection effects in the wage equation estimated by fixed-effects on the selected
sample. The value of the test statistic is χ218 = 51.22 for women and χ
2
18 = 28.39 for
men. Thus, the null hypothesis that the eighteen selection effects are equal to zero
is not accepted.
Columns 5 of Tables B.2 and B.3 report the estimates for the wage equation for
women and men, obtained by following Wooldridge (1995)’s procedure for sample
selection correction described in Subsection 3.5.1. Columns 1 to 4 display pooled
ordinary least squares (OLS), random effects (RE), fixed-effects (FE) and Heckman
(two-steps) estimates. Tables B.4 and B.5 show results of first stage probit from
the Heckman estimator and Mundlak probit.
3.6 Empirical Evidence
3.6.1 Recent trends in the raw gender pay gap
Figure 3.3 presents the evolution over time of the raw gender pay gap at three
different level of analysis: the overall gender pay gap between all employed men
and women, the gender pay gap over couples (i.e. between men and women declar-
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Figure 3.3
Gender log wage differentials over years
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Notes: BHPS, 1991-2008. 73,515 observations for the overall pay gap; 55,168
for the gender pay gap over couples; 16,650 for the spousal wage gap.
ing to be married, living as a couple or in civil partnership) and the spousal pay
gap (i.e. within couples). The second measure includes those with non-working
partners whilst the third measure excludes them.
Earning disparities are more significant within dual-earner couples, compared
to overall gender wage differentials by around 5 log points. The gender pay gap
over couples is higher than the spousal pay gap at almost every year. This is down
to the fact that it also includes working men with non-working partners who are
excluded in the within couple difference for dual-earner couples only.
Figure 3.4 displays gender differential within couples across the pay distribu-
tion, showing the wage gap of the separate male and female log wage distributions
for earners in couples. The figure shows that there have been larger changes in the
tails of the distributions. At the very bottom of the distribution the gap closed
faster than the middle, while at the highest percentiles there was little wage con-
vergence for a lower starting base.
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Figure 3.4
Spousal wage gap by percentile, selected years
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Notes: BHPS, 1991-2008. 1,051 observations in 1991, 970 in 2000 and 752
in 2008. The spousal wage gap is computed as a difference between the
percentiles of the male and female wage distributions among dual-earners.
3.6.2 Changes in couples’ earnings patterns
Figure 3.5 and Table 3.1 show how these changes in gender pay gaps play out
in terms of which partner has the highest earnings. Figure 3.5 shows that among
dual-earner couples the proportion where the man had a higher hourly rate of pay
fell from almost 80% to just 73% over the 18 years period6. These findings are in
line with U.S. data which indicate that the percentage of wives who earn more than
their husbands increased from 18% to 29% from 1987 to 2009 (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2011). Table 3.1 gives more detail on the “non-traditional”couples in
the sample (4,068 observations). It shows the female wage premium, computed
as a percent of men’s wage. As one might expect, more than one third of the
observations fall in the first category, which is the one where women earn only up
6We do not find remarkable differences between old and young couples, defined as those where
the average between the age of the two partners is lower than 40. Still, as one would expect, the
percentage of women earning more than men is slightly higher for the youngest generations
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Figure 3.5
Proportion of men earning more than their partners in dual-earner
couples
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Notes: BHPS, 1991-2008. The total number of dual-earner couples is 16,650.
to 25 percent more than their partner. By utilising panel data, recent research in
the U.S. found that, although women are increasingly likely to earn more than their
partners, the income advantage is often temporary and do not persist for many
years (Winkler et al., 2005; Winslow-Bowe, 2006). The BHPS does not allow to
explore this aspect given that non-traditional dual-earner couples continuously
followed for at least three years are only 533 (3,303 observations).
3.6.3 Assortative Mating
The statistical framework presented in Section 3.3 can now be used to explore
what lies behind this decline in share of couples where men have the higher hourly
wage. The approach relies on the Pearson correlation coefficient between spouses’
wage levels to assess the degree of sorting between partners. One potential limi-
tation of this measure is that it is unable to disentangle changes in the gender-
specific marginal distributions from changes in the association between partners’
once marginal distributions are held constant (see Halpin and Chan, 2003; Hou
and Myles, 2008; Liu and Lu, 2006; Mare, 1991). Changes in the absolute or overall
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Table 3.1
Percentage of women earning more than men and female wage premium
in non-traditional dual-earner couples.
Year Women earning Women earning Women earning
more than men up to 25% more more than 25%
1991 20.65 77.42 22.58
1992 21.60 80.95 19.05
1993 23.38 82.63 17.37
1994 21.66 78.33 21.67
1995 22.51 77.67 22.33
1996 22.57 80.28 19.72
1997 22.75 82.86 17.14
1998 22.11 80.53 19.47
1999 24.40 84.77 15.23
2000 24.90 82.23 17.77
2001 26.29 81.96 18.04
2002 25.86 82.59 17.41
2003 25.88 82.20 17.80
2004 27.08 81.51 18.49
2005 27.92 79.08 20.92
2006 28.35 80.50 19.50
2007 26.88 80.28 19.72
2008 27.39 76.21 23.79
Notes: BHPS, 1991-2008. Column 1 shows the percentage of women earning more than
their male partner in dual-earner couples; Columns 2 and 3 display women’s income
advantage, defined as a percent of men’s wage, for two different ranges of values. The
total number of non-traditional dual-earner couples in the sample is 4,068, with an
average of 226 observations per year.
rate of assortative mating may reflect both changes in the male-female wage dis-
tributions, and changes in the mate selection process of individuals once marginal
changes have been taken into account. In order to overcome this problem and pro-
vide a robustness test for our measure, we follow Bredemeier and Juessen (2013)
who suggest measuring the strength of the relationship between spouses wages in
terms of deciles instead of levels. Given that the distribution of deciles is constant
over time by construction, they argue that an increase in the correlation between
wage relative positions implies an underlying increase in positive assortative mat-
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Table 3.2
Correlation between spousal wage levels and decile positions
Years Correlation Correlation
wage levels wage deciles
1991-1996 0.29 0.28
1997-2002 0.32 0.31
2003-2008 0.30 0.30
Notes: BHPS, 1991-2008. The total number of dual-earner couples is 16,650.
ing. Table 3.2 presents the correlation coefficient between spousal wages computed
both in terms of wage levels and deciles. We provide estimates for three different
subperiods. The correlation coefficient increased from 0.29 in 1991-1996 to 0.32 in
1997-2002, after which it slightly decreased to 0.30. The fact that we obtain very
similar results with this alternative measure suggests that the movements in the
correlation of wages in terms of levels well reflect changes in the process of sorting
within couples7.
The BHPS perhaps covers a too recent period to reveal a significant increase in
the association between spousal wages over time, which would likely be detected by
looking at the same values in the early 1970s. Bredemeier and Juessen (2013) find
that in the United States the correlation coefficient between spousal wage decile
positions increased substantially over time and almost doubled from the 1970s to
the 2000s. Our estimates for the 1990s and 2000s are consistent with their results.
Given the decline in the spousal wage gap and little change in inequality and
assortative mating it is perhaps no surprise that our statistical framework predicts
it is the former which drives the fall in the fraction of couples where the male
wage is higher. The model shows that the probability that women’s wage exceeds
men’s is driven by four parameters: the difference of the wage distributions’ means
(WG), the wage distributions’ standard deviations (σ1 and σ0) and the correlation
coefficient between wage levels (ρ). The last three terms are used to compute the
difference of the wage distributions’ variances, denoted by ν in the final formula
7We also estimate the correlation of partners’ educational attainments in terms of years of
schooling and we find that this is decreasing over time, from 0.41 in 1991 to 0.34 in 1999 and
0.29 in 2008.
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Figure 3.6
Real proportions and predicted probabilities that men outearn their
partners
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Figure 3.6 compares actual proportions of men earning more than their partners
in the sample with predicted probabilities based on the statistical framework. The
predicted probabilities are well matched at the empirical level. The average ab-
solute difference between the predicted probabilities and empirical proportions is
only 1%.
Of the four parameters of the model, the mean spousal pay gap is the one
which accounts for most of the variability in the predicted probabilities. If the
mean wage gap in the final year were the same of 1991, the predicted probability
that men outearn women would be 0.780 instead of 0.726, given the values of the
other parameters in 2008. We would instead obverse a counterfactual probability
of 0.699 if the correlation coefficient between wage levels in 2008 were the same
of 1991, or 0.719 if the standard deviations of the wage distributions did not
change over time. Because both the correlation coefficient between wage levels
and the standard deviations of the wage distributions do not exhibit significant
changes over the period under consideration, their contribution to the evolution of
predicted probabilities is negligible.
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Table 3.3
Percentage of couples by year and category
Year Dual Man Female No Tot.
earners sole-earner sole-earner earners obs.
1991 68.56 22.50 5.22 3.72 1,533
1992 66.58 21.71 6.10 5.62 1,460
1993 67.23 19.56 6.86 6.35 1,355
1994 67.41 18.63 7.63 6.33 1,390
1995 67.98 18.72 6.91 6.39 1,346
1996 68.80 18.09 6.77 6.34 1,404
1997 70.73 18.70 5.82 4.75 1,305
1998 72.02 17.90 5.00 5.07 1,419
1999 71.91 17.98 5.42 4.69 1,385
2000 71.16 19.40 4.76 4.69 1,366
2001 73.76 17.79 3.95 4.49 1,315
2002 74.78 16.44 4.39 4.39 1,277
2003 74.51 16.75 4.74 4.00 1,224
2004 74.49 17.03 4.07 4.41 1,180
2005 74.63 16.48 4.27 4.62 1,147
2006 75.62 16.55 4.00 3.83 1,124
2007 76.29 15.43 3.86 4.42 1,063
2008 76.35 15.23 4.67 3.76 985
Notes: BHPS 1991-2008, own calculations. The total number of couples in
the sample is 23,278, of which 16,650 dual-earners, 4,243 man sole-earner,
1,238 woman sole-earner and 1,147 no earners.
3.6.4 Sample Selection Correction
To date we have only considered dual-earner couples but we know that labour
force participation have radically changed over this period. The percentage of
British couples which fit the traditional pattern in which the man is the sole earner
decreased from 23% to 15% between 1991 and 2008, with a corresponding increase
in dual-earner couples (as shown in Table 3.3). These changes are consistent with
findings for the United States. Using Current Population Survey data, Raley et al.
(2006) show that in 1970 the husband was the sole provider in 56% of couples;
by 2001 this percentage decreased to 25%. They also show that the proportion of
co-providing dual-earner couples nearly tripled during the same period.
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Figure 3.7
Spousal wage gap: setting zero wages for non-workers
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Notes: BHPS, 1991-2008. The figure shows the spousal wage gap
when man and female sole earner couples are included in the anal-
ysis and the wage for the non-working spouse is set to zero.
Figure 3.7 shows the implication of including couples where one spouse is not
working but the other is to the earnings gap where the hourly wage for the non-
worker is set at zero8. As would be expected, imputing zero wages for non-working
women increases substantially the spousal wage gap but the decline over the full
period is similar. The additional inclusion of female sole earner couples contributes
to lower the earnings gap within couples. The slightly more marked decline of
the early 1990s is likely to be determined by lower participation rates among
men during the economic recession. The disproportionate fall in male employment
creating more female sole-earner couples (see Table 3.3) which reduces the spousal
wage gap with zero wages for non-earners.
Colums 2 to 5 of Table 3.4 show how this na¨ıve imputation affects the estimates
of the proportion of men earning more than their partners and the correlation co-
efficient between wage levels. Including male sole earner couples in the assessment
of which spouse earns the higher wage, with the non-earner given a zero hourly
8At this stage, no earner couples are excluded from our analysis.
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wage, sees the male primary wage rising from 79% to 84% at the beginning of the
period and from 69% to 75% at the end. Compared to its original values based on
observable wages, the correlation coefficient decreases substantially and the addi-
tional inclusion of female sole earner couples originates even negative estimates. So
a natural next step is to deal with the selection process behind non-participation
more formally. We exploit the panel nature of our data where we can observe wages
for currently non-working spouses in other data periods to improve the efficiency of
the selection equation estimation. Here we use the estimator set out in Wooldridge
(1995).
3.6.5 Wage Imputation
Next, we use Wooldridge’s hourly wage predictions to impute values for non-
working individuals and to investigate how the spousal wage gap changes accord-
ingly. Figures 3.8 show the implication to the earnings gap of imputing wages
for non-workers in couples where we observe the real wage for one spouse and
we can observe the wages of the non-earning spouse in other periods. So we are
exploiting the panel element of the data. As one would expect, the imputation
of potential wages for non-working women (2,296 imputed observations) increases
the spousal wage gap compared to dual-earning couples, which means that the
fall in the spousal wage gap is less than that observed in dual earner couples.
The effect is particularly marked from the late 1990s onwards. This means that
the women who are excluded from labour market participation are increasingly
those with the lowest potential wage and the narrowing of the spousal wage gap is
slightly exaggerated by this increasingly negative selection of which women do not
work. The additional inclusion of couples where the man is not working but the
woman is (723 imputed observations) does not substantially alter the evolution of
the spousal wage gap over time.
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Figure 3.8
Spousal wage gap: stepwise imputation of potential wages for
non-working women and men with more than two wage observations.
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Notes: BHPS, 1991-2008. Predicted hourly wages for non-working women and men,
in man and woman-sole earner couples respectively, are computed from Wooldridge
estimates.
Colums 6 to 9 of Table 3.4 present the effect that the stepwise imputation of
potential wages has on the proportion of men earning more than their partner and
on the correlation coefficient between wages. Figure 3.8 and the last two columns
of Table 3.4 suggest that changing selection of who is in work is exaggerating the
convergence in wages within couples. The raw decline in the spousal wage gap, the
extent men earn more than their partners, fell from 45% to 32% accounting for
the fact that is increasingly women with very low potential earnings who are left
not working. Likewise the proportion of men earning more than their partner falls
a little less rapidly.
When interpreting these results, one caveat should be expressed. Taking into
account the panel dimension comes at the additional cost of excluding from the
sample those couples where partners do not participate in the labour market for
at least two years. When it comes to wage imputation for non-working people,
one should consider that excluded individuals are likely to have a potential wage
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lower than the average. Table B.6 presents sample statistics by gender for non-
working people, divided into those who do not participated in the labour market
for at least two waves and those having instead two wage observations or more.
The figures suggest that individuals with less than two wage observations are on
average older, lower educated, with more health problems and their partner earn
a lower wage compared to those who are employed for at least two waves. Figure
B.1 shows the evolution of the spousal wage gap under the wage imputation based
on the Heckman estimator, including also individuals with less than two wage
observation.
3.7 Conclusions
This paper analyses the evolution of the spousal wage gap (i.e. gender pay gap
within couples) and its relationship with the overall pay gap, changes in labour
force participation and the level of assortative mating between partners. We present
a statistical model which shows how the probability of a positive spousal wage gap
depends on the average gender wage gap, the variance of the male and female wage
distributions and the correlation between partner’s wages. The model shows how
men can still earn more than their partners even with a low overall pay gap when
assortative mating is high or the variance in earnings is low. We show how the
model fits the data well and use it to explore what lies behind the observed decline
in men earning more than their female partners. We then take into account changes
in labour force participation patterns. We employ the estimation method developed
by Wooldridge (1995) to correct for sample selection in panel data models where
we can observe wages in other periods for individuals. We show how increasing
participation of women has drawn in those with higher potential pay leaving those
with lowest potential earnings still out of the labour market. Overall the picture
is that men have around 32% higher hourly wages than their partners when both
work. This is down from 45% in 1991. It is now the case that a little over one in
four women have higher hourly pay than their partner. If we take into account
that it is women with very low potential wages who remain out of work the pay
gap remains at 35%.
Appendix A
Description of variables (Chapter
1)
A.1 List of tasks
Analytical
Paying close attention to detail
Teaching people (individuals or groups)
Making speeches/ presentations
Working with a team of people
Specialist knowledge or understanding
Knowledge of how organisation works
Spotting problems or faults
Working out cause of problems/faults
Thinking of solutions to problems
Analysing complex problems in depth
Checking things to ensure no errors
Noticing when there is a mistake
Planning own activities
Planning the activities of others
Organising own time
Thinking ahead
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Reading written information (e.g. forms, notices and signs)
Reading short documents (e.g. reports, letters or memos)
Reading long documents (e.g. manuals, articles or books)
Writing materials (e.g. forms, notices and signs)
Writing short documents (e.g. reports, letters or memos)
Writing long documents with correct spelling and grammar
Adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing numbers
Calculations using decimals, percentages or fractions
Calculations using advanced statistical procedures
Interpersonal
Dealing with people
Persuading or influencing others
Selling a product or service
Counselling, advising or caring for customers or clients
Listening carefully to colleagues
Knowledge of particular products or services
Manual
Physical strength (e.g. to carry, push or pull heavy objects)
Physical stamina (e.g. to work on physical activities)
Skill or accuracy in using hands/fingers (e.g. to assemble)
Knowledge of use or operation of tools/equipment machinery
A.2 Variables construction
Wages. Our wage variable is the gross hourly pay (gpayp). This derived variable
is available for all the three waves of the UK Skill Survey. For most cases gpayp
was computed as gross usual weekly pay divided by usual hours worked per week
(including usual overtime). In 1997 respondents quoted an hourly rate directly:
these values, when available, were used to replace gpayp (727 cases). Nominal
gross hourly wages are deflated by the Consumer Price Index, with 2005 as the
base year. Wages are measured in British Pounds. We trim our data such that
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hourly wages lower than 1 and higher than 100 are excluded.
Occupations. We classify occupations according to the International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO−88) (see ILO, 1990). Occupations were orig-
inally classified according to the Standard Occupation Classification (SOC 90 in
1997, SOC 2000 in 2001 and 2006). Codes are manually matched on the basis of
the guidelines distributed by the Occupational Information Unit of the Office for
National Statistics, correcting both for employment status and the size of the or-
ganisation/establishment (number of people working) when available. The same
procedure is applied to the variables indicating the past occupation. Crosswalks are
made available by the CAMSIS project at: http://www.camsis.stir.ac.uk/occunits.
This harmonisation allows to compare occupations over time and to make our re-
sults strictly comparable to other papers. ISCO-88 defines four levels of aggrega-
tion, consisting of 10 major groups (one-digit), 28 sub-major groups (two-digits),
116 minor groups (three-digits) and 390 unit groups (4-digits).
Education. Our education variable distinguishes three groups of workers: high,
medium and low educated (skilled). For all the three waves we exploit the variable
dquals1 which indicates the highest qualification held by the interviewee. Both
educational and vocational qualification levels are available in the list provided to
respondents. In 2001 and 2006 one more options, “Masters or PhD degree”, was
added whereas earlier respondents were not allowed to differentiate the type of
degree. We follow Schneider (2008) to convert the UK’s educational and vocational
qualifications to International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97)
levels. The usual ISCED division into low, medium and high is then adopted where
low is equivalent to ISCED 0-2 (i.e. primary and lower secondary education),
medium is given by ISCED 3-4 (i.e. upper secondary and post-secondary non-
tertiary education) and high is ISCED 5-7 (i.e. tertiary education). The derived
categorical variable for education takes value of 1 for low educated, 2 for medium
and 3 for high.
Task measures. We create task content measures which capture the intensity
of the different activities carried out by each worker. This is done by performing
a principal component analysis (PCA) for each of the three groups into which
we categorise the 35 tasks (analytical, interpersonal and manual). The PCA is
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a statistical technique which aims at reducing correlated variables into a smaller
number of principal components. It is a common procedure in the existing litera-
ture on job content analysis (see Autor et al., 2003; Autor and Handel, 2009; Goos
et al. 2010). A detailed description of the PCA technique can be found in Jolliffe
(2002). The routine measure is derived from a question related to the frequency of
routine activities performed by workers on the job (b13 in 1997, brepeat in 2001
and 2006). All task measures above described are rescaled to range between 0 and
1.
Computer use. We create a measure which captures the intensity of computer
adoption, interacting the scores of two questions: one related to the importance of
computer use (from “essential” to “not at all/does not apply”); the other to its
complexity (from “simple” to “advance”). The variables used are ja17 and m1 for
the 1997 survey, cusepc and dusepc for 2001 and 2006. This variable is normalised
to [0-1].
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Figure B.1
Potential wages for non-working women and men.
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Notes: BHPS, 1991-2008. Potential wages for non-working women and men, in man
and woman-sole earner couples respectively, are computed from Heckman estimates.
Individual with less than two wage observations are also included in the sample.
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Figure B.2
Density of the male log wage distribution in dual-earner couples
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Figure B.3
Density of the female log wage distribution in dual-earner couples
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Table B.1
Description of the main variables in the wage and selection equations
Log. Hourly wage Log wage per hour (deflated by the 2005
Consumer Price Index)
Age Age in years
Age squared Age in years squared (divided by 10)
Education Years of education
Work Dummy variable; 1 if the individual works
Number of children Number of children in the household
Health problems Dummy variable; 1 if the individual has
some health problems
Partner works Dummy variable; 1 if the partner/spouse works
Non labour income Household non labour income (excluding benefits)
in thousands (divided by 1000)
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Table B.2
Wage equation women, 1991-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Pooled Random Fixed Heckman Wooldridge
OLS(a) effects(a) effects(a) 2-steps(b) (1995)(b)
Age 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.024** 0.013*** 0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.013)
Age sq. -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Education 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.074*** 0.076***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Lambda (Heckman) -0.366***
(0.020)
N 15,859 15,859 15,859 15,859 15,859
Wald test
Unobs.(c) χ219=25.71
Notes : BHPS 1991-2008. Constant and year dummies are included but not reported.
Standard errors in parenthesis. (a) Standard errors robust to serial correlation and het-
eroskedasticity; (b) boostrapped standard errors (1,000 replications); (c) χ19 test statistics
for the joint significance of the variables in the vector x¯it. Significance levels *** p< 0.01,
** p< 0.05,*p< 0.10.
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Table B.3
Wage equation men, 1991-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Pooled Random Fixed Heckman Wooldridge
OLS(a) effects(a) effects(a) 2-steps(b) (1995)(b)
Age 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.070***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.011)
Age sq. -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Education 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.061***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Lambda (Heckman) 0.055
(0.039)
N 19,211 19,211 19,211 19,211 19,211
Wald test
Unobs.(c) χ219=31.73
Notes : BHPS 1991-2008. Constant and year dummies are included but not reported.
Standard errors in parenthesis. (a) Standard errors robust to serial correlation and het-
eroskedasticity; (b) boostrapped standard errors (1,000 replications); (c) χ19 test statistics
for the joint significance of the variables in the vector x¯it. Significance levels *** p< 0.01,
** p< 0.05,*p< 0.10.
88 Chapter B. Extra Figures and Tables (Chapter 3)
Table B.4
Selection equation women, 1991-2008
(1) (2)
Variable Probit(a) Mundlak
Probit(a,b)
Age 0.183*** 0.209***
(0.016) (0.048)
Age sq. -0.025*** -0.020***
(0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.010) (0.010)
N. children -0.372*** -0.239***
(0.020) (0.021)
Health -0.218*** -0.067*
(0.039) (0.028)
Partner works 0.567*** 0.365***
(0.062) (0.052)
Non labour income -0.168*** -0.108***
(0.041) (0.031)
N 21,167 21,167
Notes : BHPS 1991-2008. Year dummies are in-
cluded but not reported. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. (a) Standard errors robust to serial corre-
lation and heteroskedasticity; (b) unobserved in-
dividual effects are modeled as a linear projection
onto the within means of the regressors. The con-
stant is included but not reported. Significance lev-
els *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05,*p< 0.10.
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Table B.5
Selection equation men, 1991-2008
(1) (2)
Variable Probit(a) Mundlak
Probit(a,b)
Age 0.143*** 0.300***
(0.020) (0.064)
Age sq. -0.020*** -0.026***
(0.002) (0.003)
Education 0.066*** 0.066***
(0.011) (0.011)
N. children -0.120*** -0.054*
(0.030) (0.027)
Health -0.485*** -0.038
(0.048) (0.037)
Partner works 0.556*** 0.343***
(0.055) (0.050)
Non labour income -0.361*** -0.386***
(0.082) (0.096)
N 21,846 21,846
Notes : BHPS 1991-2008. Year dummies are in-
cluded but not reported. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. (a) Standard errors robust to serial corre-
lation and heteroskedasticity; (b) unobserved in-
dividual effects are modeled as a linear projection
onto the within means of the regressors. The con-
stant is included but not reported. Significance lev-
els *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05,*p< 0.10.
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Table B.6
Sample statistics for non-working women and men.
Variable Less than two More than two
wage observations wage observations
Women Men Women Men
Age 42.232 49.072 37.908 46.025
(11.226) (9.457) (9.454) (10.36)
Age squared 190.949 249.729 152.637 222.547
(91.931) (83.675) (77.011) (89.951)
Education 11.743 11.229 12.341 12.368
(2.26) (2.106) (2.408) (2.722)
N. children 1.064 0.564 1.314 0.729
(1.151) (0.907) (1.04) (1.003)
Health 0.642 0.861 0.577 0.654
(0.48) (0.439) (0.494) (0.476)
Non labour income 0.174 0.213 0.151 0.46
(0.658) (0.383) (0.421) (0.794)
Log. wage partner 2.314 1.75 2.465 1.983
(0.537) (0.468) (0.545) (0.55)
N 1,581 445 2,296 723
Notes : Columns 2 and 3 report descriptive statistics for non-working
women and men with valid information on all the variables in the wage
and participation equations, who participate in the labour market in
less than two waves. Columns 4 and 5 display the same figures for
women and men with two or more wage observations. Standard devia-
tions in parenthesis. No earners couples are excluded.
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